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This thesis presents how the American and German governments used their
official websites to support or oppose the war in Iraq in 2003. This study is a qualitative
framing analysis of vAvw.whitehouse.gov, www.bundesregierung.de, the American
newspaper New York Times, and the German newspaper Die Welt. The timeframe of
documents examined in this study is from March 1st, 2003 until May 1st, 2003. The
theories of framing and agenda-setting were used to examine the websites as well as the
New York Times and Die Welt.
The results of this study show that the American government used distinct frames
to set the agenda in order to gather support from the .American public. The New York
Times used similar frames to wvvwvwhitehouse.gov, but additional frames were found,
discussing issues not mentioned on the U.S. governments website. In the same way the
German government used specific frames to set its agenda to gather support from the
German public to unify and oppose the war in Iraq. Frames found in Die Welt were very
similar to those on the website with some additional information about the war.
There were distinct differences found between the coverage of the war among the
American and German websites and newspapers. Tne frames of the U.S. governments

website www.whitehouse.gov had distinct differences in ranking and content to the
frames in the New York Times. Whereas the frames of the German governments website
www.bundesregierung.de and the frames of Die Welt ranking and content wise were very
similar.

Keywords: framing, agenda setting,, war, Iraq, political, U.S., Germany,
governmental websites, New York Times, Die Welt
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
To many people the wax in Iraq in 2003 seems to be a repetition of what happened
in the early 1990’s in regards to politics, media coverage and the impact of
communication. The Gulf War also caused discussions about the magnitude of issues
around the world. The parties involved were examined closely regarding their policies
and the media’s role.
Much research has been done about the occurrences and the impact the Gulf War
had on the communication field, but the research of last year’s war is still in the making.
Communication research about the Gulf War was done with the use of theories such as
agenda-setting, framing, gatekeeping and other public opinion theories such as the Spiral
of Silence. I find these theories very useful for an examination of the war in Iraq in 2003
as well, but almost no papers have been published in the communication field on this
subject to date.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the theories of agenda-setting and framing
and study how they help explain the media coverage of governmental activities, such as
the war in Iraq in 2003. This research will give a better insight in how these theories can
be useful in contrasting how the U.S. and German governments distribute information
about policies, conflicts and in this instance - war. This research is important for people
in any country to be able to interpret information given directly by their governments as
well as the enhancement o f understanding of the media’s usage of government sources. It
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will also help the public to evaluate coverage of wars and conflict as well as possible
propaganda.
The first and to this date, only published journal article dealing with
communication aspects and the war in Iraq of 2003 is, “Public relations and propaganda
in framing the Iraq war: a preliminary review” by Ray Eldon Hiebert, where the author
discusses public relations and propaganda strategies used by the Whitehouse and
Pentagon to frame the war in Iraq. One of the frames identified by the author is the
particular justification of a war, which will also be discussed as one o f the findings of this
study.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Agenda-setting and War Coverage
Agenda-setting is “the idea that media don’t tell people what to think, but what to
think about” (Baran & Davis, p. 311). Agenda-Building is “a collective process in which
media, government, and the citizenry reciprocally influence one another in areas of public
policy” (Baran & Davis, p. 314). Carter (1998) finds that “by choosing which stories are
disseminated, editors are able to influence the public’s perception of what are the
important issues of the day” (p. 392). This study will look at which stories were
emphasized by the German and American governments in order to influence the public’s
opinion. Scheufele (2000) found, that “agenda-setting research has widely accepted the
media agenda as a given and only a few studies have considered the process by which it
is constructed” (p. 5). The author also stated that “agenda-setting needs to be examined
across levels of analysis” (p. 5), which include agendas of the media we well as the
government. Scheufele (2000) concluded that many agenda-setting studies found a
“positive association between the amount of mass media content devoted to an issue and
the development of a place on the public agenda for that issue” (p. 7).
Brosius and Weimann (1996) found that “most agenda-setting studies have
focused on the effects of media agendas on the agendas of the public and decision makers
as well as the public’s effect on decision makers” (p. 562). And their study revealed that
“interpersonal communication could enhance agenda-setting effects when the discussion
dealt with issues covered in the media” (p. 563). Therefore interpersonal communication
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can reinforce or compete with the media’s agenda, depending on its power and usage,
leading to issues of opinion leadership as well (Brosius & Weimann, 1996).
Baran and Davis (2003) explained how Iyengar and Kinder (1987) demonstrated
causality when they wrote that “Americans view of their society and nation are
powerfully shaped by the stories that appear on the evening news. We found that people
who were shown network broadcasts edited to draw attention to a particular problem
assigned greater importance to that problem” (p. 313).
“The activities and issues the media cover and include in their content make up
the media’s agenda of what the public should think about” (VanSlyke Turk & Franklin,
1987, p. 31). VanSlyke Turk and Franklin (1987) found that agenda-setting of political
news differ internationally. They examined American and British journalists according to
governmental public information on local media and governmental levels to find these
differences. In both countries “an important task for government and for the public
relations practitioners they employ is the separation and transmission of messages to the
media” (p. 31). No such studies have been conducted to compare American and German
practices, especially when the opinion about the topic studied differs drastically among
these nations.
Wanta and Foote (1994) examined the influence a president has on the media’s
“coverage of issues on which he is an important source” (p.437) such as international
crises. They found that there is a strong give-and-take, interactive relationship between
the media and the President that is very different than the public-press relationship, with
which he is successful in influencing media coverage. Their research suggests that “an
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elite official, such as the President, should play an important role in the process of
agenda-setting” (p. 441). Their analysis of presidential documents “clearly showed the
President's success in influencing the media agenda” (p. 440). Especially during the Gulf
War, "presidential statements and media coverage after the invasion could have affected
the results, because the news media likely would have approached President Bush for
information about the invasion” (p. 442). Wanta and Foote (1994) discuss how “during
some international crises, however, the President may have been able to keep some issues
on the media agenda, even after real-world events subsided, by emphasizing the issues”
(p. 447). They concluded, “that the President influenced media coverage” (p. 445) during
the Gulf war, but that in general “media coverage also may have influenced presidential
emphasis” (p. 445). This may very well be the case in the govemment-press relations
during the war in Iraq in 2003, which this study will examine.
Baran and Davis (2003) found that lead stories have a greater effect in terms of
agenda-setting, which shows the importance of the position of a story in a newscast or
newspaper. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) state that rather than increasing television agendasetting power, dramatic news accounts undermine the agenda-setting process and that a
vivid presentation also may be important. Igengar and Simon (1993) found that the
media set the agenda of the Gulf War. It was the most important topic of news coverage
during the crisis. Shifts in public opinion regarding the issue of conflict involve “the
amount of news coverage accorded various political issues will dictate the degree of
importance that the public attaches to these issues” (Iyengar & Simon, 1993, p. 367). The
authors found, that “the 4G ulf came in for a greater share of public attention than the
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economy, deficit, and drugs combined. Just as readily, the ‘G ulf disappeared from the
public agenda” (p. 374).
Okeowo and Swain’s (1999) study used the theory of agenda setting to examine
the 1967-1970 Biaffan-Nigerian civil war, analyzing news magazine coverage to
determine whether public relations strategies employed by both sides were successful and
advisable. The authors concluded, that “the ability of a government to seek to position
itself positively or its enemy negatively through public relations or publicity might well
be enhanced if that nation begins with comparatively low visibility and unmeasured
valence on the Western media and public agendas” (Okeowo & Swain, 1999, p. 53).

Information and Flow of Communication
The two-step flow o f communication indicates the existence of an opinion leader
or another second person between the media and the recipient of media information.
Brosius and Weimann (1996) tested their hypothesis on German television networks,
finding that the notion of the two-step flow o f communication exists and greatly affects
media’s agenda.
Lenart and Targ (1992) interpreted their agenda-setting research in the way that
“media potential for setting and altering political consciousness in a well-examined field
of empirical research in political science” (p. 356).
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Framing of Politics and War
Framing is related to agenda-setting due to its “focus on the relationship between
public policy issues in the news and the public perceptions o f these issues” (Semetko &
Valkenburg, 2000, p. 93). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) defined news frames as the
tools to “convey, interpret, and evaluate information” (p. 94). These frames are being
used to talk about public events. Lenart and Targ (1992) stated, that the “selection,
presentation, emphasis, and exclusion of media frames results in persistent patterns of
cognition and interpretation that routinely organize the content and parameters of public
discourse” (p. 341). By framing the media or public select certain parts of their perceived
reality “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94).
The authors identified five frames common in U.S. news coverage:
(1) Conflict frames, which “emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or
institutions as a means of capturing audience interest” (p. 95),
(2) Human interest frames, which bring “a human face or an emotional angle to
the presentation o f an event, issue, or problem” (p. 95),
(3) Economic consequences frame, which report “an event, problem, or issue in
tenns o f the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group,
institution, region, or country” (p. 96),
(4) Mortality frame, that “puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of
religious tenets or moral prescription” (p. 96), and
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(5) Responsibility frame, which “presents an issue or problem in such a way as to
attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to
an individual or group” (p. 96).
During this study it will become apparent, that the German as well as the
American government made extensive usage o f conflict frames, human interest frames as
well as responsibility frames. Also important to remember is, that “media frames are
shaped by economic interests, dominant ideologies, government influences, and
journalistic norms” (Lenart & Targ, 1992, p. 342), which both countries have a history of
using to establish their influence in the political world.
In their 2000 study, Semetko and Valkenburg analyzed newspaper stories and
television news and found that the responsibility frame was most often used by the media
to report a political event. According to their data most news reported was from the past
24 hours and sensationalistic news concentrated mostly on human interest stories.
Framing was used by Iyengar and Simon (1993) to research news coverage and
military affairs and found their respondents reported “higher rates of exposure to
diplomatic response to the crisis” (p. 365). Looking at the coverage of the Gulf War, the
authors found that audiences were rarely given background information of the conflict,
history, socioeconomic, or cultural aspects of the conflict. Due to the frames set by the
media, Iyengar and Simon (1993) “anticipated that exposure to television news would
enhance viewers’ preference for the military” (p. 379). Lenart and Targ (1992) state, that
the "government spends large amounts of money compiling and disseminating selfserving information that serves as the source of a large percentage of materials used in
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news stories” (p. 354). This is, according to the authors, often a fraction of the journalists
need and want of “readily available information” (p. 354) and they are unlikely to
“challenge official frames and thus antagonize the government media source” (p. 354).
This study will be comparing the government’s official website and compare it with the
two major papers in each country, to see if these frames were indeed picked up by
journalists.
Scholars suggested that media frames parallel U.S. policy (Lenart & Targ, 1992),
which he draws from the observation of the “dependence on agency press releases and
briefings, essentially public relations operations, serves to blur the line between the
notions of and independent, public interest press and a press that facilitates the dispersion
of official propaganda” (Lenart & Targ, 1992, p. 353)
In his 1999 research, Scheufele developed a process model of framing including
the four stages of frame building, setting, individual-level process and feedback loop, for
which he suggested future research. These stages are based on the agenda building
process. Therefore frame building is “the formation of frames” (p. 115), frame setting is
“concerned with the salience of issues, frame setting, or second-level agenda-setting” (p.
116). The “individual-level influence of audience frames (is based) on several
behavioral, attitudinal, and cognitive variables (which) have been examined using, in
most cases, black-box models” (p. 117), and the feedback loop constantly introduces or
reproduces these frames. (Scheufele, 1999).
The framing of wars and information flow during Times of conflict is also
considered to be propaganda. Nowadays news, though distributed and framed by the
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government is rarely considered propaganda, and it is "less known how the United States
Government manipulated the domestic news media during the Cold War years” (Parry Giles, 1996, p. 149). The author questions the amounts of “interactions between the
propaganda program and the domestic news medium” (p. 150) and their influence on
journalists and therefore the information the public receives. Gattone (1996) argues that
during the Gulf War “most reporters knew they were part of a massive propaganda
campaign, but were unable to avoid covering the war on the administration’s terms due to
the limited material it offered” (p. 198).
The framing of the Gulf War was focused on “‘clean images’ such as high
technology, efficiency, and expertise, while at the same time deemphasizing civilian
casualties and the unpleasant realities of death and suffering (Kanjirathinkal and Hickey,
1992, p. 105). The authors also found that “the media portrayal of events such as the
Persian Gulf War not only depicts the flesh and blood realities of war and global politics,
but also evokes a myth in which the forces o f good confront evil in an epic drama” (p.
105). They categorized the media’s war coverage into “The Myth of the Hero”, “Good
versus Evil”, “Overcoming Obstacles”, “Fulfillment and Return”, and “Incomplete
Exorcism”, where they found interesting facts about the media coverage o f the Gulf War.
Similar categories will be used in this study to examine the government publications as
well as newspapers in both countries. Kanjirathinhalan and Hickey (1996) found that
average soldiers were elevated to heroic levels (p. 108), the president demonized Sadam
Hussein (p. 106), stripped him of any “socially acceptable personas” (p. 107) and the
media focused on battered POWs, release of crude oil, pollution, rapes, murders and
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plundering (p. 107). “The media then described various encounters between heroes and
demons” (p. 109) and finally documented the return of the hero is “symbolized in
dramatic parades, marches, weapons displays, and touching scenes of family reunions,
shown in close-ups for maximum cathartic effect” (p. 110). Similar findings will be
demonstrated and discussed in this study after examining the documents published.
Liebes (1992) conducted a study “comparing Israeli coverage of the Palestinian
intifadeh and American coverage o f the Gulf (“our” wars) with American coverage of the
intifadeh (“their” war)” (p. 44), which revealed very different framing mechanisms. The
author concluded that journalists treat their own country’s wars in different way from
other people’s war, bringing up the question of objectivity, neutrality and balance
(Liebes, 1992).

Computer-mediated Communication
The literature on computer-mediated communication (CMC) helps explain how
people may use the Internet. In her book, Barnes (2003) discusses, how during early
research computer-mediated communication was seen to be impersonal or even hostile
communication, but that "these expectations do not hold true among experienced
computer users because many individuals mix work correspondence with informal social
messages" (p. 34).
The Internet is “the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this
country - and indeed the world - has yet seen” (Carter, 1998, p. 391). This relatively new
form of communication changes the way we communication with each other and our
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government communication issues such as politics and conflict to us. The German and
American governments, just as many other across the world, have transformed their
communication techniques to this new medium and are able to set agendas and frame
issues according to their policies. “During the nineties, computer-mediated
communication (CMC) - denoted by such phrases as the Net, the World Wide Web, and
cyberspace - has become the latest technological form to achieve the status of
democracy’s savior” (Nedderman, Jones, & Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 9-10).
Levin (2002) stated how Howard Rheingold argued that “the political significance
of computer mediated communication lies in its capacity to challenge the existing
political hierarchy’s monopoly on powerful communications media, and perhaps thus
revitalize citizen based democracy” (p. 81). Rheingold was also quoted by Nedderman,
Jones, and Fitzgerald (1998) as finding CMC to be “a phenomenon that every virtual
community member knows instinctively, the power of informal public life... Cyberspace
is one of the informal public places where people can rebuild the aspects of community
that were lost when the malt shop became a mall” (p. 10-11). Computers have changed
the flow and availability of information and news (Levine, 2002). The author also argued
that though we have this easier access, “most citizens know very little about politics not
because such knowledge is hard to find but because they have no interest in finding it” (p.
84), which makes the internets importance and effectiveness to politics questionable. He
also draws attention to the “inefficiency of government agencies is partly caused by their
complicated procedures for moving information” (p.85)
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In their conclusion Nedderman, Jones, and Fitzgerald (1998) found that CMC
cannot cause democracy to spread or flourish; but CMC may be especially helpful in
making us better democrats, in facilitating the open discourse and the public policy
formation processes associated with democratic institutions” (p. 19). Gattone (1996)
writes that “carrying out a war increasingly involves a sophisticated understanding of
how to use information technologies in the management o f public opinion” (p. 197). In
his paper he stated, how computer-mediated communication was being used by the
government during the Gulf War “to frame the conflict in a certain way” (p. 198), which
is what this study will also discuss in the findings.

SUMMARY
In this study the theories of agenda setting and framing will be vital in describing
the communication released on the U.S. and German government websites as well as
articles published in the American newspaper New York Times and the German
newspaper Die Welt.
Agenda-setting is “the idea that media don’t tell people what to think, but what to
think about” (Baran & Davis, p. 311). This idea will help examine the websites of the
German and American government to determine what agenda they had to communicate
to their citizens.
Framing is related to the study of agenda-setting. By framing the media or public
selects certain parts of their perceived reality “to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’” (Semetko &
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Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). To determine the agenda of the German and American
governments, the author of this study will have to examine the frames apparent in the in
the communication of their websites as well as the newspapers selected.
Computer mediated communication is a relatively new form of communication
involving the Internet. It has changed the way we communicate with each other and how
our government communicates issues such as politics and conflict to us. The author will
also discuss whether CMC had an impact on the communication passed on to Americans
and Germans.

PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to examine how the U.S. and German governments
used their official websites to promote or oppose the war in Iraq. This study will examine
which stories and information were emphasized by both sides and how they were trying
to promote their cause. Frames and agendas of each government’s website will be
determined.
The purpose of the study is also to conduct a qualitative framing analysis on how
the American newspaper New York Times and the German newspaper Die Welt reported
about the American government’s need to act, the German government’s opposition to
the war, the United Nations involvement, the impact on international relations, plans for a
future Iraq and other issues developed through the coding process. The author will
compare the frames apparent to determine whether the U.S. as well as German
government had certain agendas in publicizing this war.
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This study will not be looking at the development of the war itself. The author
will not discuss military advancements, strategic plans reports of casualties,
bombardments and captures.
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RESEARCH QUESTION
RQ1: What are the dominant frames, besides military information, found in the
documents the American Government released through its website
www.whitehouse.gov?

RQ2: What are the dominant frames, besides military information, found in the
documents the German Government released through its website
www.bundesregierung.de?

RQ3: What are the dominant frames, beside military information, found in the articles
published in the New York Times?

RQ4: What are the dominant frames, beside military information, found in the articles
published in Die Welti

RQ5: How do the agenda and frames of the New York Times compare with the agenda
and frames of the documents U.S. Government published on its website
www.whitehouse.gov just before and during the war in Iraq in 2003?

RQ6: How do the agenda and frames of Die Welt compare with the agenda and frames of
the documents German Government published on its website
www.bundesregierung.de just before and during the war in Iraq in 2003?
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
Iraqi War: For the purpose of this research study the term Iraqi war will be considered the
ih

time frame of the beginning of combat on March 15 , 2003 till the official end
of combat on May 1st, 2003.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

WEBSITES
In this study the researcher conducted a framing analysis to determine the U.S.
and German governments’ uses o f their websites www.whitehouse.gov and
www.bundesregierung.de in order to promote or oppose the war in Iraq of 2003.

Whitehouse.gov
The U.S. government’s website creators have developed a special section called
“Iraq: Special Report”, of which the researcher has printed and analyzed the News
Releases, Speeches, Global Messages, and Fact Sheets published by the government and
stored in the websites “Achieves”. The American governmental documents were
accessed and printed in October of 2003. This research study only includes documents
that were present on the website at this particular time and does not take into
consideration documents that were on the websites before and might have been removed
in the meantime, as well as documents that might have been added later in the year.

Bundesregierung.de
This study will also look at the German government’s publications on
www.bundesregierung.de. Documents were retrieved from the “English Section” under
the link buttons o f “Press Releases” and “Speeches”. These documents were chosen
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because they are the closest to what the government intended the public to know about
the government’s mission and the war. The German government documents were
accessed and printed in January 2004. As it is the case with www.whitehouse.gov, the
analysis o f www.bundesregierung.de only includes documents that were present on the
website at this particular time and does not take into consideration documents that were
on the websites before and might have been removed in the mean time, as well as
documents that might have been added later in the year.

Timeframe
The messages in the selected publications have not yet been altered and
interpreted by the media. The documents used for the study were published in the time
period from March 1, 2003 until May 1, 2003. These particular dates were determined to
be the beginning and cut off date of this study, because the publication of information
about the war is still ongoing. March 1st lets the researcher still include some pre-combat
information, which seems to be important to why the U.S. government decided on a war
with Iraq and some controversial issues regarding this decision. May 1st was selected in
order for this study to include material of actual war time. During this time, the U.S.
government posted 77 of the earlier mentioned documents on its website and the German
government posted 43 documents.
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NEWSPAPERS
After conducting a framing analysis of the government documents this study will
determine which of the messages were also published in the American newspaper the
New York Times and the German newspaper Die Welt during the same time period. This
will help determine whether the U.S. and German governments’ agendas differed from
the agendas set by the newspapers, as well as the frames used to describe the conflict in
Iraq.

New York Times
The author selected the New York Times as a source due to its reputation as the
most literate, comprehensive and magisterial of U.S. newspapers (Goss, 2003). The paper
is known for its international newsgathering ability and extensive international and
foreign affairs coverage (Zhang & Cameron, 2003). The newspaper ranks 3rd in
circulation and enjoys the reputation of high journalistic prestige (Kengan, 2002). The
New York Times is a good choice for this topic, because it is also the choice for
intellectuals, politicians, and other powerful members of society, which puts them into
the position to influence debates on important issues (Kengan, 2002).
The New York Times has archives on the academic search engine Lexis-Nexis,
during February 2004, and was searched for the terms “Iraq” and “war”. To further focus
the article selection this study will only focus on the “Section A” of the newspaper, which
mainly deals with government policies and international issues. During an initial search
over 556 articles were found. Excluded from the study were editorials as well as news

21

summaries. The reason for excluding editorials was the fact, that there was no direct
comparison to be made with the websites, and the news summaries just repeated the
information already discussed in the generally published articles. The number o f articles
was reduced to 214 during the coding process due to the nature of the articles. Some
articles came up during the search, but did not represent the content matter required for
this research project.

Die Welt
The German newspaper selected by the researcher to investigate this topic is Die
Welt, which also ranks 3rd in circulation and is one of the most respected and prestigious
papers in Germany (Cooper-Mahkom, 1998). “Die Welt aspires to be the paper that will
explain German politics” (Dougherty & Roberson, 1999, p. 16) and is known to be
stodgily conservative. Like the New York Times in the United States, Die Welt is known
for the journalistic accomplishments and the choice of news source by intellectuals.
The Archives of Die Welt were accessed in Januaiy 2004 through the website
www.diewelt.de. Doing a general search for Iraq in the online archives of Die Welt for
articles concerning Iraq in the selected time frame resulted in 1607 articles. Due to
restrains on research time the decision was made to focus on the section of Die Welt that
deals with politics in Germany. This was found to be the best solution because the
German government’s policies will be discussed in this section of the paper. Search terms
were “Irak” (Iraq) and “Krieg” (war). 94 articles were included in the study.
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Editorials were also here excluded from the study, because of the reasons given
for the New York Times. New Summaries did not exist in Die Welt.
The archives of Die Welt did not have an English version. The articles were
translated by the researcher, which lead to no direct quotes being able to be included into
this section of the study.

Timeframe
These two papers have been selected for a framing analysis of the article
pertaining to the war in Iraq in the time frame from March 1 through May 1, which
includes the time shortly before the beginning o f the conflict until the end of combat.
This also represents the same time frame of analysis as the American and German
governmental websites for accurate comparison.

CODING
While reading through the documents chosen to be included in the study, a
number of themes became apparent. The author noted those themes throughout each
group of documents and then created frames according to these themes. These frames
were created to help readers understand the material covered more clearly. Codings made
in the frames are not mutually exclusive, which means that some peaces of information
may have been coded and counted in one or more frames. The data was not coded by
stories, but by pieces o f information.
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Whitehouse.gov
During the coding process the documents from www.whitehouse.gov were broken
down into the categories of “Need to Act”, “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime”, “U.S.
as the Savior”, “Future Plans”, “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”,
and “International Involvement”.
The frame “Need to Act” entails information regarding the reasoning of the
administration to pursue a conflict in Iraq. Messages with a negative connotation against
the Iraqi government or the Iraqi people were gathered under the category “Negative Talk
against Iraqi Regime”. “U.S. as the Savior” is a category where information will be
described the United States military as a savior of the Iraqi people, the Middle East and
the World. The government released much positive information about its troops and their
commitment and this type o f rhetoric will be called “Building Support and Positive Talk
about U.S. Troops”. The last category is “International Involvement”, where the author
will discuss the international opinions about the conflict as well as the impact on
international relations. These categories were chosen to present the much different intent
o f messages the U.S. government wanted to communicate to its people and everyone
around the world (since the posting of messages on websites made this information
retrievable from anywhere).
Military information will be excluded from this study. Though much “factual”
information was released, the military developments are not of interest of the researcher.
These categories include all the data in the documents on www.whitehouse.gov and are
therefore to been seen as effective in analyzing the documents.

24

Bundesregierung.de
During the coding process the documents from www.bundesregierung.de are
broken down into the categories of “No War - More Inspections,” “Humanitarian
Concerns,” “Support by the German Government,” “International Relations and U.S.German Relations,” and “The Role of the United Nations.”
These frames were chosen to present the many different intents of messages the
German government wanted to communicate to its people and the international
community. Major themes found on the website include information of the German
government’s and people’s disapproval with a military intervention without United
Nations support. This rhetoric as well as demonstrations were gathered in a category
called “No War - More Inspections.” One o f the reasons the German government
opposed a military intervention was its belief that the U.N. inspections were effective and
that the intelligence regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was not complete. A major
concern of the German government seemed to have been the delivery of humanitarian aid
and the well being of the Iraqi people, which is being examined in the category
“Humanitarian Aid”. The category “International Relations and U.S.-German Relations”
discusses the German government concerns about relations among its allies, especially
the United States and what the discussion of the conflict has done to them. The last
category in the documents provided by the German government, is its concern about the
role of the United Nations in this conflict and the discussions going on at Security
Council meetings. This was examined in the Section “United Nations”.
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New York Times
The coding o f the 214 articles in the New York Times lead to the following
frames. The messages of the newspapers can be grouped in the “The Role of the United
Nations,” “Future Plans and Cost,” “International Relations,” “Humanitarian Concerns.”
“Need to Act,” and “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.”
The frame “The Role o f the United Nations” covers the discussions that took
place in Security Council meetings regarding this issue. The frame “Future plans and
Cost” displays the information about the discussions o f Iraq’s future, reconstruction and
the costs associated with this. This frame also includes the discussion about international
involvement in the future of a potentially war-tom country. Further reports about
international discussions about Iraq were gathered in the frame of “International
Relations”. The frame o f “Humanitarian Concerns” discusses the need and organization
of humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people. In this frame, the author describes conditions
reported in the New York Times, which made Iraqis living conditions difficult. Many
articles in the New York Times stated the U.S. governments “Need to Act”, describing
conditions under which a military intervention was needed. Lastly the frame of “Negative
Talk about the Iraqi Regime” gathered all negative statements made about the Iraqi
Regime in the New York Times.

Die Welt
The dominant frames established for coding of Die Welt articles are “Call for no
war and more inspections,” “International Relations and U.S.-German relations,” “The
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Role of the United Nations,” “Support by the German Government,” “Humanitarian
concerns,” “Legality of the war,” and “Future Plans.”
The frame “Call for no war and more inspection” displays the messages found in
the Die Welt articles that display anti-war message and the need for more inspections. A
larger portion of the Die Welt coverage discussed the effect this war is having on
international relations, in particular U.S.-German relations, which is being gathered under
the frame of “International Relations and U.S.-German relations”. The role of the United
Nations was emphasized by many of the newspapers articles and will be represented in
the frame “The Role of the United Nations”. The newspaper also reported on the German
governments and the German peoples concern for the Iraqi people and how they would
be supplied with humanitarian aid, if the United Nation was not involved in a military
intervention in Iraq. These messages will be gathered in the frame of “Humanitarian
Concern”. The frame “Legality of the War” gathers the information representing
concerns of a legal war without United Nations involvement. The frame of “Support by
the German Government” discusses pledges made by the German Government to support
the international community with the situation in Iraq. Lastly, the frame “Future Plans”
deals with the discussions reported on involving the future o f Iraq and who needs to plan
and pay of the reconstruction - will it only be the U.S. or will the U.N. and other nations
help?
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
During the course of the coding of www.whitehouse.com for the categories of
‘"Need to Act”, “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime”, “U.S. as the Savior”, “Future
Plans”, “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”, and “International
Involvement” the researcher came to the following results.
The most common frame, with 27 % of coding found in the data set, was the
frame of “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops.” This includes the
praises o f the U.S. military to boost morale among troops as well as the building and
maintaining support of the public at home. “U.S. as the Savior,” the second common
frame with
19 %, covers rhetoric used by the U.S. administration to portrayed itself as a noble savior
of the Iraqi people and the world. This positively charged frame is intended to gather
more support from the American people. The frame “Need to Act,” next common frame
with 18 %, includes information communicated to the American public why the U.S.
government felt the need to act by using the means of military intervention. The frame of
“Future Plans,” 18 % of the data set, covers the U.S. administrations statements on what
to do in the future in Iraq. This includes how to deal with reconstruction, a creation of a
new government, as well as the length of stay by United States military. “Negative Talk
about the Iraqi Regime” entails all statements made by the U.S. administration to cast the
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Iraqi regime in a very negative light. This information covered 13% o f the frames
determined. Lastly, under frame o f “International Relations,” which covered 6 % of the
data set, the information released by the U.S. government pertaining to involvement by
the international community during the selected time period.

TABLE 1

Most Common Frames on www.whitehouse.gov:

“Negative Talk
against Iraqi
Regime”
13%

“International
Involvement”
6%
J

“Need to Acf’
27%

“Future Plans’
17%
‘TJ.S. as the
Savior”
18%

“Building Support
and Positive Talk
about U.S.
Troops”
19%

Need to Act
In this frame the data was gathered that included information communicated to
the American public on why the U.S. government felt the need to act by using military
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intervention. It was the most common type of information found in the data and covers 27
% of all codings made.
Most of this information was communicated before the beginning of major
combat. Reasons given were the existence of weapons of mass destruction, the fact that
Saddam’s regime targeted civilians, destroyed natural resources, and maintained
connections with terrorist networks. President Bush stated 44W e’re dealing with Iraq
because the dictator of Iraq has got weapons o f mass destruction; he’s used weapons of
mass destructions on his own people. He can’t stand America, he can’t stand our friends,
he can’t stand our allies and he’s got connection to terrorist networks.”
The Bush administration felt the need to destroy chemical and biological weapons
in the hands of Saddam and disarm him. The U.S. government saw Saddam Hussein as a
threat to international peace due to his continuing efforts to produce missiles, as well as a
threat to the security of the region. It also felt that 12 years after the end of the Gulf War
the Iraqi regime has not complied and had not cooperated 44...immediately,
unconditionally, and actively” with U.N. sanctions.
The Bush administration decided that the U.N. inspections did not work
and there was an imminent threat in the form of a danger of development of nuclear
weapons as long as Saddam holds power and aids, trains, and harbors terrorists which
have a deep hatred for America. 44Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of terror, and
provides funding, training, and safe haven to terrorists” he 44. . .has a long history of
reckless aggression and terrible crimes”. U.S. leaders decided that they need to take every
threat seriously and not turn away from conflict in order to help prevent future acts of
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terror and to protect America. They also felt that Iraqis deserve to be lifted from
insecurity and tyranny and should be able to enjoy freedom, prosperity, and equality.
The author of the website documents stated that “The Iraqi regime has not
complied and has not cooperated ‘immediately, unconditionally, and actively’” and there
were still over 10,000 liters of anthrax unaccounted for.
On March 17th President Bush addressed the nation, and during this speech the
frame of Need to Act was very apparent. He stated, that “Our good faith has not been
returned...”, Saddam Hussein “ ...conceals some of the most lethal weapons ever
devised”, “the regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s
neighbors and against Iraq’s people” and that he might do it again and “kill thousands or
hundreds of thousands of innocent people.”
Communication by the administration on www.whitehouse.gov stated that
“peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed” and that now a military
intervention had to follow, in order to “rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction” and free
the Iraqi people.
After the beginning of combat the administration released hardly any
communication fitting this frame “Need to Act.” The only time that this frame was being
mentioned is on a fact sheet on April 4th, where anecdotes of life under Saddam Hussein
showed precisely why the United States administration felt the need to act. Once again,
the U.S. government stated that it needed to prevent the Iraqi regime from using its
hidden weapons of mass destruction and that the Iraqi people are good and gifted people
who deserve to be free.
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There was no longer any need to communicate the necessity of a military
intervention after it took place, because if the administration had not made its case by
now it would admit an illegal aspect of this intervention.

Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops
This category includes the praises of the U.S. military to boost morale among
troops as well as the building and remaining support of the public at home. Combined
with the related category of “U.S. as the Savior” it was the most prominent frame in the
administrations website. Both frames indicate a very highly charged publicity impact. It
was the second most common type of information found in the data and covers 19 % of
all codings made.
The administration stated that the United States of America does not turn away
from its duties because they are difficult, it will assume immense and unacceptable risks
and Saddam cannot weaken the military’s morale with fear.
The communication by the administration became more detailed after the
beginning of combat. The administration repeatedly praised the military for its great skill
and bravery; the communication said that the U.S. will prevail. It stated that the military
will liberate Iraq and that the Iraqis demonstrate the honorable and decent spirit of the
American military.
In many of the president’s speeches he thanked the soldiers and their loved ones
and appreciated their sacrifice - “Thanks to the courage and might o f our military...” and
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“We all appreciate what you do on behalf of the security o f this country,” were some of
the president’s statements.
The communication often points out the fact that the U.S. military treats Iraqi
military prisoners humanely and highlights the soldier’s daring against ruthless enemies.
U.S. and coalition soldiers are “ ...treating innocent civilians with kindness, and showing
proper respect to soldiers who surrender.”
Attention is often drawn to the fact that the American public needs to pay tribute
to the professionalism and integrity o f its forces and that the current generation of the
military is not letting the public down “Their skill and their bravery, stands in sharp
contrast to the brutality of Saddam’s regime”. “The current generation of our military is
not letting us down,” and it is continuing to uphold the finest tradition and making this
country proud. Other phrases often used are “acting together in a noble purpose” and
“honorable conduct of our military.”
U.S. President Bush explained, that “We fight for the liberty of an oppressed
people, for the security of the United States, and for the security of the world.” He added,
these “ .. .act o f heroism and generosity...” will be rewarded. He also praised the
“ .. .strengths and kindness and goodwill...” of the U.S. military.
Most statements of this kind were made in March. Only a few references fitting
this frame resurfaced in the last days of this data analysis, when it seemed very likely for
official combat in Iraq to be over.
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U.S. as the Savior
This frame covers rhetoric used by the administration to portray itself as a noble
savior of the Iraqi people and the world. This positively charged frame does also intends
to gather more support from the American people. It was the third most common type of
information found in the data and covers 18 % of all codings made.
The U.S. administration stated that the “tyrant will soon be gone,” and the day of
liberation of the Iraqi people was near. It said that it is the U.S.’s duty to defend its
people by uniting against the violence. The administration needs “to disarm Iraq, to free
its people and to defend the world from grave danger” in order to ensure that there will be
“no more aggressions against your (Iraq’s) neighbors, no more poison factories, no more
executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms.” The president
announced that the United State’s mission is “to free the Iraqi people from the clutches of
a brutal dictatorship.” “Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against
the violent. American and our allies accept that responsibility.”
President Bush also promised to deliver needed food and medicine and help to
build an Iraq that is prosperous and free as well as that the military will not destroy oil
wells, which mean wealth for Iraqi people.
The administration also promised, in its communication, to spare innocent
civilians from harm, make the world more peaceful, and fight for the liberty of an
oppressed people, for the security of the U.S. and its friends and allies. President Bush on
many occasions said in his speeches that “ . . .we will defend our freedom. We will bring
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freedom to others and we will prevail,” which was again repeated in the Global
Messages, put out the next day.
President Bush made his belief in freedom for the world clear when he said, “the
liberty we prize is not Americans gift to the world, it’s God’s gift to humanity.” He added
that he believed the “ .. .long-suffering Iraqi people will be free...” from a brutal dictator
with his administration’s help. Mr. Bush, on multiple occasions, said that he wanted to
“Make all free nations o f the world more secure, and to free the Iraqi people..
for the liberty of the oppressed people..

“ .. .fight

and “ .. .save lives... .”

In April only three references were found that could be coded as the frame of the
“United States as the Savior.” This may mean that President Bush and his administration
felt that they have clearly communicated the frame of the United States role o f the savior
to the Iraqi people and the world.
The few comments that were made in April stated that “Now America has entered
a fierce struggle to protect the world from a grave danger and to bring freedom to an
oppressed people.” “We have applied our might in the name of peace, and the name of
freedom. That’s why we applied our might and gave our word that the threat from Iraq
would be ended.”

Future Plans
This frame covers the U.S. administration’s statements on what will happen in the
future in Iraq. It was the fourth most common type of information found in the data and
covers 17 % o f all codings made.
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As the administration often emphasized before the war, that it will in the future
deliver food and medicine, blankets and water, deliver humanitarian relief, bring
economic sanctions to a swift close, and work for the long-term recovery of Iraq’s
economy. “Any military presence, should it be necessary, will be temporary and intended
to promote security and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, the delivery of
humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstructions of Iraq.”
The Bush administrations repeatedly promised to remain as long as necessary,
prevent and repair damage caused by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the natural
resources (with oil being the major concern) will remain the property' of the people of
Iraq. The government also stated that it will protect Iraq’s territorial integrity, help its
people determine the precise form of Iraq’s new government and, after the war is over,
support representative government. The administration pledged, “We will protect Iraq’s
territorial integrity; we will support representative government that will govern Iraq on
the democratic basis of human rights and the rule of law.”
In their publications, the administration threatened that Saddam and his sons must
leave Iraq or their presence will provoke attacks. It was made clear that war crimes will
be prosecuted, and war criminals will be punished. The U.S. government also often stated
that Iraqi military units will receive clear instructions on how they can avoid being
attacked.
After the beginning o f combat hardly any information about future actions were
published by the government, the administration only stated again that they will spare
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innocent lives, will prosecute with the utmost vigor, stay as long as necessary, and
address immediate suffering.

Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime
This category entails all statements made by the U.S. administration to put the
Iraqi regime in a very negative light. It was the fifth most common type of information
found in the data and covers 13 % of all codings made.
The administration continuously portrayed the Iraqi regime as a brutal regime
with a history of mass murder and a “ .. .long history of brutal crimes... .” The
communication stated that the U.S. is not dealing with peaceful men and that they “.. .will
not be intimidated by thugs and killers.”
After the beginning of combat the administration put out many more of these
negative messages. They reported that Saddam Hussein had placed Iraqi troops and
equipment in civilian areas, attempting to “ .. .use innocent men, women and children as
shields for his own military final atrocity against his people.” President Bush said that
this “outlaw regime” threatened the peace with weapons of mass murder and does not
have any regards for conventions o f war or rules of morality.
The administration called Saddam Hussein a “brutal dictator” and “tyrant” who is
“evil at heart in many different ways.” Saddam’s troops are being called thugs who are an
“enemy that knows no rules of law,” will wear civilian uniforms, willing to kill in order
to continue the reign of fear. It added U.S. soldiers are facing the most desperate elements
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of a doomed regime, which use real civilians as human shields, pretend to surrender, and
kill their own citizens.
The Iraqi regime was called a “violent criminal gang calling itself a government”
which breaches all the proper conventions of war. The releases of pictures of executed
British soldiers were called acts of cruelty beyond comprehension. The government also
gives examples such as a dissident who had his tongue cut out and others being tied to a
stake in the town square where they bled to death. Regular army forces tried to desert, but
got blown away by fellow Iraqi citizens.
Not only Saddam and his regime were portrayed to be “tyrants,” but Saddam’s
sons are also called “brutal, brutal people” - “barbaric in nature,” a group of men that
used fear as a tool of domination by President Bush.

International Involvement
In this frame the information released by the U.S. government pertaining
involvement by the international community during the selected time period is gathered.
It was the sixth, and least common type of information found in the data and covers 6 %
of all codings made.
In the first publications the administration called upon the international
community for help and support and stated that they will work closely with the
international community. These two statements concluded the information released
before combat.
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After the beginning o f combat the U.S. government stated that it has the
finest of allies. They published statements o f support from the coalition, which usually
simply included the promise of use of airspace. President Bush also stated that these
countries have not “ ...failed to act.”
The administration credited a number of members with the securing of the
southern oil field and vital port cities and with the delivery o f tons of humanitarian aid.
They praised the gunfire provided to support coalition troops, the clearing o f port of
mines, the securing o f a key Iraqi oil platform in the Gulf, the monitoring o f Iraqi
intelligence, and with providing a special chemical and biological weapon response
forces. The U.S. Administration thanked the international community for providing
supplies, logistical and intelligence support, basing and over-flight rights, and
humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and sharing the sacrifices of this war.
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GERMAN GOVERNMENT
During the course o f the coding of www.bundesregierung.de the frames of “No
War - More Inspections,” “Humanitarian Aid,” “International Relations,” “Support by the
German Government,” and “The Role of the United Nations” surfaced.
The frame of “No War - More Inspections” represents a larger portion of released
information by the German government on www.bundesregierung.de and involves the
issue, that the German government opposed the war in Iraq. This frame covers the most
common type of information found in the data and includes 42 % of all codings made.
“The Role of the United Nations”, which covers 29 % of codings, displays the frame
involving the importance of the United Nation during the conflict in Iraq. Here the
German government mainly points out the necessity of war being approved through the
U.N. and not alone by one nation. The frame of “Humanitarian Aid”, with 10 % is the
third common frame and gathered the German governments’ statements that voice
concern about enough humanitarian aid, pledge to provide humanitarian assistance, work
out ways for the United Nations to provide humanitarian aid, and the governments
concern for the people of Iraq. The German government stressed its position towards the
importance of the maintenance o f good international relations throughout the documents
published, which were gathered in the frame “International Relations” and also covered
10 % of codings. The least common frame with 9 % of codings, is “Support by the
German Government” and discusses the German government position against the war,
but its pledges for certain levels of support to the United States and British
administrations.
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TABLE 2

M ost Common Frames on www.bundesregierung.de:

“International
Relations”

“Support by the
German
Government’
9%

10%

“No War - More
Inspections”
42%

“Humanitarian Aid'

“The Role of the
United Nations”
29%

No W ar - M ore Inspections
A larger portion o f released information by the German government on
www.bundesregierung.de involves the issue, that the German government opposed the
war in Iraq. This was the most common type of information found in the data and covers
42 % o f all codings made.
Until almost the end of March the documents entailed messages, that the weapons
inspections are working, the Iraqi government is destroying weapons as requested and the
German government believed that through negotiations by U.N. authorities Iraq can be
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convinced to cooperate better with the demands of the international community, in
particular the United Nations.
The German government stated many times on its website that there were
effective alternatives to war and th a t44.. .a war would only foment further hatred,
divisiveness and intolerance.” The Schroeder administration supported its position by
stating their concern about the consequences to the people of Iraq and possible deaths, as
well as the effects of “ .. .economic sanctions under which the people of Iraq are suffering
can be eased and ultimately lifted together.”
The government stated its case for more inspections and no military intervention
by stating that there is “ .. .no justification either for abandoning the weapons inspection
process or for replacing it with a strategy which involves the use of force.” The
government felt that the current intelligence provided by the United States and Britain did
44.. .not justify a war that would bring certain death to thousands of innocent men, women
and children.” A majority of statements called for more inspections and that disarmament
should be the top priority.
Stating that “war must never be inevitable” and that the international community
has to do anything to “avert a humanitarian disaster” the government made it their
mission to promote peace.
“Germany would not approve a U.N. resolution that legitimized a war against
Iraq,” was the policy of the administration though March. The government also stated
that "‘Germany would not participate in an intervention against Iraq” because it believed
in a “political solution to the crisis.”
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The administration thought that “ ...the destruction o f the Al-Samoud missiles is a
visible sign of real disarmament’’ and the United Nations should continue its weapons
inspection in Iraq with the aim being “full disarmament of Iraq by peaceful means.”
Officials also believed, that there were signs of “...noticeable improvement in Iraqi
cooperation with the inspectors” and this should be continued.
After the beginning of the military intervention by the United States and British
military, German Chancellor Schroeder stated, that “The news that the war against Iraq
had begun evoked a strong sense of concern and dismay in the German government.” It
still believed that it was possible to “avoid a confrontation” through “accelerated and
intensified” weapons inspections in Iraq.
German Chancellor Schroeder exclaimed in multiple press conferences, which
were transcribed on the governments’ website that “The Middle East needs a new peace,
not a new war.”
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The Role of the United Nations
This frame displays the information involving the importance of the United
Nation during the conflict in Iraq. Here the German government mainly points out the
necessity of a war being approved through the U.N. and not alone by one nation. It was
the second most common type of information found in the data and covers 29 % of all
codings made.
The United Nations has been and continues to be a framework for the promotion
of peace and “Iraq conflict should be dealt with by the U.N. Security Council” if the
peaceful route which was proposed by the Security Council and supported by the
overwhelming majority within the international community is not possible. It is also the
view of the German government that “ .. .Iraq can and must be disarmed peacefully on the
basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.”
Chancellor Schroeder repeated his position, that “No one should be entitled to
take military action against the country without prior legitimation by the U.N. Security
Council,” and that the “German constitution permits involvement in military operations
only on the basis of a corresponding U.N. resolution.” The government stressed that the
“U.N. Security Council is and must remain the center of decision-making on the Iraq
crisis” and a decision to go to war needs to be “on the basis o f the U.N. Charter.” A
spokesperson for the government stated, that “the German government wants to see a
multilateral world order with a strong role for the United Nations.”
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Germany is “prepared to assume responsibility” and will fulfill its international
obligations, but the government feels like and often states that the “primary responsibility
for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the Security Council.”
The administration strongly believed, that “ ...reconstruction of the country should
(...) be carried out under the directing of the U.N.”
In regards to humanitarian aid, the German government said that “humanitarian
aid (should be delivered) under the leadership of the United Nations” and supports that
“U.N. aid organizations have appealed to member nations to provide an additional 2.2
billion dollars for refugees and the people in Iraq.” The website,
www.bundesregierung.de also reported on the passage of a U.N. resolution to “...restart
the oil-for-food program.”

Humanitarian Concerns
In this frame the study gathered the government statements that pledge to provide
humanitarian assistance, work out ways for the United Nations to provide humanitarian
aid, and the governments concern for the people of Iraq. It was the third most common
type of information found in the data and covers 10 % of all codings made.
The German government in the first pieces of communication released, expresses
its concern “to prevent the impending humanitarian disaster in Iraq.” The administration
calls this threat of a humanitarian disaster a “catastrophe,” making a point o f urgency.
Chancellor Schroeder stated repeatedly throughout the documents that, “The
German government is willing to support the United Nations and its specialized agencies
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in providing humanitarian relief to help alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.” Often
mentioned throughout the documents is the reaffirmation of “Germany’s willingness to
help provide emergency aid and refugee relief,” and the governments strong support to
..restart the ‘oil-for-food’ program,” to provide humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people.
Numerous statements were made that the government “ .. .stressed the priority
need to provide the people of Iraq with food, water, and basic health care” and that
“Germany, like other counties, will help to finance humanitarian assistance provided on
the basis of the U.N. resolution.” The government stressed the importance of this issue
often proclaiming that they will fulfill their international obligations.
In one of the last pieces of data, German chancellor Schroeder remarked that “The
responsibility for seeing to it that the basic needs of the civilian population are provided
for lies in the hands o f the coalition forces who have waged this war.” He made his point
that responsibilities towards the Iraqi people cannot be forgotten.

International Relations
In this frame the German government stressed their position towards the
importance of the maintenance of good international relations throughout the documents
published. It was the fourth most common type of information found in the data and
covers 10 % o f all codings made.
The main message apparent in this frame is that the German governments
“ ...international involvement is greater than it has ever been before...” and important to
the administration.
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A good example is the repeated mentioning of a memorandum issued by
Germany, France and Russia against the war, showing that decisions are not being made
on an individual basis. Statements of “ ...Russia support(ing) the German position...” and
comments that the government hopes the difference of opinion will not damage or have
long-term effects on German-American relations.
Schroeder often stated that Germans and Americans are good friends and good
allies and Germany will “ ...ensure the protection of American facilities in Germany...”
and “.. .protect the families o f military personnel living in Germany.” Not wanting to
damage international relations Germany early on and later repeated its willingness to
“grant overflight, transit and access rights in the event o f a military intervention against
Iraq.” These statements were made just before and at the beginning of combat.
The further into war, the more strained relations became. In April
www.bundesregirung.de reported that U.S. President Bush was reported to have
described U.S. - German relations to be “At best, we are estranged friends, where
‘estranged’ probably has to be underlined and ‘friends’ put in inverted commas”
Germany’s concern was also involved with the European Union’s role in this
conflict and documents discuss Germany’s opinion, that “Europe should play a prominent
role in the process of stabilizing postwar Iraq.” Germany’s general policy, “...we are
partners in Europe and we want more European responsibility,” emphasizes this unity.
In one of the last pieces o f data examined the German government reported, that
“ .. .there is full agreement between Germany and Ukraine with regard to Iraq” and also
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talks about Russian-German relations that have strengthen over the course of this
conflict.

Support by the German Government
This frame discusses the German government position against the war, but its
pledges for certain levels of support to the United States and British administrations. It
was the least common type of frame, created from the data and covers 9 % of all codings
made.
The German government made it very clear, that since the attacks on September
11th Germany would “.. .provide military assistance to the United States in the fight
against international terrorism.” When inspections in Iraq and the discussion of war
intensified the administration pledged, that, “Germany will support the work of the
inspectors with personnel and equipment” and “provide considerable resources for the
inspections.” German Chancellor Schroeder also multiple times stated that Germany’s
“ ... international involvement is greater than it has ever been before.” The administration
also made its opinion about the importance for humanitarian assistance clear, by pledging
help. “Like other countries, (we) will help to finance humanitarian assistance provided on
the basis of the U.N. resolution...,” said Chancellor Schroeder, “If we can help, for
instance with providing medical treatment for children, then this is an obvious
humanitarian obligation.”
After criticism o f German policy became louder, the administration stated, that
“ .. .the German government has never ruled out the use of force as a last resort,” and it

would “...fulfill its international obligations under the aegis o f the United Nations.”
“Germany will do what it can to help achieve stability and peace in the region, if this
desired,” and their support o f the United States is best stated in this part o f a release,
pledging help and fulfillments of Germany’s international obligations:
“With regard to protecting U.S. assets, using U.S. bases in
Germany, as well as granting overflight rights, Schroeder said the
stance taken by the German government on Iraq did not change the
fact, that the United States and Great Britain are alliance partners
and friends. The alliance provides rights but it also imposes
obligations. These obligations follow from the provisions o f the
North Atlantic Treaty and various status-of-forces agreements.
Schroeder reaffirmed that the German government would continue
to respect these agreements. He said there may be differing
positions on this in international law, but in light of German’s
alliance obligations the German government would continue to
allow the use of U.S. bases and not deny overflight rights. He
added that it went without saying that American assets would be
protected and - to the extend possible -also the families of military
personnel living in Germany.”
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N EW YORK TIMES
The coding of the 214 articles in the New York Times lead to the results presented
in the following section. The messages of the newspapers can be grouped in the “The
Role o f the United Nations,” “Future Plans and Cost,” “International Relations,”
“Humanitarian Concerns,” “Need to Act,” and “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.”
The most common frame found in the articles published in the New York Times
from March 1st until May 1st is the issue of “The Role of the United Nations”
involvement in the war. This frame includes 29 % of codings made in the data set. The
New York Times thoroughly covered the discussions that took place in Security Council
meetings regarding this issue. The next most common frame, which covers 22 % of
information, discusses Iraq’s “Future Plans and Cost,” associated with this. The frame
also includes the discussion about international involvement in the future of a potentially
war-torn country. Further reports about international discussions about Iraq were
gathered in the frame of “International Relations”, which also covers 22 % of codings
made. But this frame also includes the disagreements about the American Governments
decision to go to war in Iraq, which drove a rift between the U.S. and some, mainly
European, countries. The frame of “Humanitarian Concerns”, covers 12 % of codings and
discusses the need and organization o f humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people. In this
frame, the author describes conditions reported in the New York Times, which made
Iraqis living conditions difficult. Many articles in the New York Times stated the U.S.
government’s “Need to Act.” This frame covers 9 % of all codings and describes
conditions under which a military intervention was needed and also includes one of the
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most compelling statements made by the U.S. government to act in Iraq. The Times
extensively reported on the threat the United States faces through Iraq and its weapons of
mass destruction. Last but not least important, was the frame of “Negative Talk about the
Iraqi Regime.” In this category, which covers 6 % of all codings, the author gathered all
negative statements made about the Iraqi Regime in the New York Times, which was not a
very prominent frame, but seemed important to the author for the course of this study.

TABLE 3

M ost Common Frames in the New York Times:
‘Negative Talk
about the Iraqi
Regime”
6%

“Need to Acf’
9%

“The Role of the
United Nations”
29%

“Humanitarian
Concerns’
12%

“International
Relations”
22%

“Future plans and
Cost”
22%
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The Role of the United Nations
This category includes the information found most often in the articles of the New
York Times. The coverage of the role of the United Nations, meetings and discussions
was extensive and covers 29 % of all codings made.
At the beginning of the conflict the newspaper reported that it was reported to the
“Security Council that Iraq has made ‘very limited’ progress toward full disarmament
was followed by Iraq's decision to destroy a whole class o f banned ballistic missiles,”
(Tyler, 03-01-03) which lead the United States further down the road towards war.
Leading up to the beginning of the conflict the New York Times extensively
reported on the U.S. governments efforts to influence the vote at the United Nations
Security Council to legitimize military action against Iraq. “Mr. Bush is desperately
pursuing Mr. Fox for Mexico's crucial vote on the United Nations Security Council in
favor of a resolution implicitly authorizing an American-led attack on Iraq” (Bumiller,
03-03-03). The United States governments decision to enter the war was partially
influenced by, “The new United Nations report, noting that Iraq had been found able to
make chemical warheads for longer-range Scud missiles, said inspectors ‘assumed’ that
Iraq could do so for shorter range missiles as well,” (Cushman, 03-10-03) as the New
York Times reported.
The Times also reported on the extensive international battles that occurred at the
United Nations regarding a war in Iraq. French President Chirac stood firm saying, that
his country

. .would veto a United Nations resolution threatening war against Iraq”

(Sciolino, 03-11-03). While the U.S. President Bush said that his military would stage,
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“ ...an attack on Iraq, whether or not the United Nations approved” (DePalma, 03-11-03).
Joining this debate at the United Nations, Kofi Annan, U.N. secretary general said,
“ .. .any military action taken without Security Council backing would violate the United
Nations Charter” (DePalma, 03-11-03). The difficulties at the United Nations prompted
the New York Times to describe the situation in the matter that, “President Bush and his
plans for war with Iraq took two steps forward at home, and one step backward at the
United Nations and abroad” (DePalma, 03-1 l-03).It was repeatedly reported that, “If the
United States and Britain attack Iraq without United Nations backing, under the rules of
the Geneva Convention they will be considered occupying powers and the onus of
preventing any relief crisis will fall to them” (Santora, 03-13-03). This made the role of
the U.N. crucial.
After the beginning o f the war the focus of the United Nations role as described in
the New York Times shifted from votes on whether to enter the war to the United Nations
role o f contributing humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. The Times reported that “more
than 16 million Iraqis now dependent on the United Nations' oil-for-food program”
(Tyler, 03-12-03).
Towards the end of combat the New York Times reported on the U.S. government’s plains
for Iraq’s future it became apparent that “Plans for the rebuilding of Iraq call for private
American corporations to undertake much of the work, with the United Nations
development agencies and other multilateral organizations sidelined” (Becker, 03-18-03).
The paper also reported on discussion on “...whether the United Nations oil-for-food
program could be restarted quickly...” (Tyler, 04-02-03) in order to help the Iraqi people,
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as well as other roles the United Nations will assume during the postwar period. Reports
were made, that “United Nations involvement might be necessary to convince banks and
financial markets that they could safely and legally lend money to Iraq” (Stevenson &
Hoge, 04-08-03). Other nations have established that it is “ ...expected (for) the United
Nations to play an important role, whether as a political facilitator or dealing with issues
like reconstruction or human rights,” (Stevenson & Hoge, 04-08-03) according to New
York Times articles. But later articles report that “The Bush administration awarded the
Bechtel Group o f San Francisco the first major contract today in a vast reconstruction
plan for Iraq that assigns no position of authority to the United Nations” (Becker& Opel,
04-18-03).
It was reported, that “President Bush pledged ... to grant the United Nations a
‘vital role’ in postwar Iraq, but defined that principally as providing food, medicine and
aid” (Stevenson, 04-09-03). Just a few days later an article a senior administration official
was quoted saying that the administration does not “.. .see the need for a U.N. operation
at all —the Iraqi interim authority will be the equivalent of a civilian U.N.
administration” (Becker & Opel, 04-18-03). This theme became more apparent, after
other administration officials were being quoted in the New York Times saying that, “Iraq
will not be put under a U.N. flag. The U.N. is not going to be a partner” (Becker & Opel,
04-18-03).
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Future Plans and Cost
During the first five weeks examined in this study not many mentions were made
in articles of the New York Times, most likely due to lack of the release o f government
plans for postwar Iraq and the countries reconstruction. It was the second most common
type of information found in the data and covers 22 % of all codings made.
First reports stated that one of “Mr. Bush's top security aides said recently that it
was not possible to tell, even now, whether any war would last ‘three days, three weeks,
three months or three years’” (Sanger, 03-03-03). Americans needed to realize that the
government is involved in Iraq for the long haul. The article also clearly criticized that
“Mr. Bush and his aides have never really addressed the question of casualties, cost or
even how long a war in Iraq might last” (Sanger, 03-03-03). It questioned from the
beginning the existence o f concrete future plans.
The New York Times reported on discussions taking place about the formation of
a new government. First reports quoted President Bush saying that, “The United States
has no intention o f determining the precise form of Iraq's new government” (Sanger, 0303-03).
The U.S. Government planned to “ .. .act swiftly in appointing an interim
authority” (Tyler, 04-05-03). Administration official said “...an interim authority would
draw from Iraqis both inside and outside the country and serve as ‘a repository of
sovereignty,’ but would not act ‘as a provisional government’” (Tyler, 04-05-03).
Initially the New York Times reported, “Under the initial timetable, that move was not to
take place until three to six months after the government fell” (Jehl & Schmitt, 04-30-03).
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But on April 20th the New York Times reported, according to administration officials,
“ .. .the scope of that has yet to be defined” (Shanker & Schmitt, 04-20-03). Through
repeated mentioning in articles it is being made clear, that “The goal is not to install some
particular group as the new leaders o f Iraq,” (Pundrum, 04-07-03) which would
“ ...absolutely contradict the whole notion of democracy” (Pundrum, 04-07-03). It was
also reported, that the “United States will not tolerate an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq,”
(Jehl & Schmitt, 04-30-03) clarifying the administration’s requirements.
Some statements by government officials reported the “...rebuilding Iraq would
cost at least $20 billion a year” (Wakin, 03-12-03). Other articles suggest, that the
estimated “$20 billion a year estimate of costs ‘would be much greater’” (Tyler, 03-1203). Early on the New York Times reported that the “White House request an immediate
$3 billion for Iraq reconstruction tasks and food aid for the initial postwar phase” (Tyler,
03-12-03). Articles suggested that some members of the international community were,
“.. .looking toward the post-war situation, where Europe will be called upon to provide
aid and participate in rebuilding Iraq” (Bernstein, 03-18-03). It is also reported, that “At
this stage, the only plan for including foreign corporations is as subcontractors to the
American companies that win the bids” (Becker, 03-18-03). It added, “ ...even British
companies have been excluded” (Becker, 03-18-03).
A number of articles discussed administration statements that Iraq’s oil resources
are expected to play a critical role in “...financing Iraq's reconstruction as Washington
faces massive rebuilding costs and uncertain partners with whom to share the burden”
(Tyler, 03-20-03). But for this to be the case, the United Nations will have to remove the
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sanctions imposed on Iraq. The administration plans that the Iraqis will, “ ...work with the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, institutions with which the United
States enjoys wide influence, to reshape the country. In the end, much of the
reconstruction is to be paid for with revenues from Iraq's oil” (Fisher, Feuer, & Kifer, -420-03).
Mistakes by administration officials were also reported by the Times, such as the
following remarks by Mr. Rumsfeld. "I don't believe the United States has the
responsibility for reconstruction..." (Shanker &Bumiller, 03-28-03) of Iraq after the war.

International Relations
The next most widely reported, covering 22 % o f the codings, was on issue
involves the United States and the toll the war in Iraq has taken on the countries
“International Relations.”
The reports in the New York Times about support and opposition of the
international community and the influence on international relations were very extensive
during the weeks leading up to major combat, when the world was discussing what to do
about the situation. But after the beginning of combat hardly any articles involved the
mentioning of international relations anymore until talks about the postwar period began.
This is when a few articles again mentioned international involvement and relations.
In the first articles of this data collection, the New York Times reported that “the
Bush administration until now has argued that neither France nor Russia nor China will
want to risk the ‘isolation’ that would come from using their veto at the Security Council
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only to have the United States, Britain, Spain, Italy and many of the smaller nations of
Europe peel away to act in concert” feeling confident in its international presence. But
the more apparent it became that some countries will not vote for a U.N. resolution in
enter a war in Iraq, the more strain was put on international relations. Articles reported
that “Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin argued on the telephone over war and Iraq,” (Tyler, 03-0103) and a Russian official was quoted that how the U.S. “.. .decide(d) on Iraq is going to
have some consequences for U.S.-Russian relations” (Wines, 03-01-03). The Russian
president was not the only one contacted by the administration. President Bush contacted
numerous international leaders. As reported, “Mr. Bush is desperately pursuing Mr. Fox
for Mexico's crucial vote on the United Nations Security Council in favor of a resolution
implicitly authorizing an American-led attack on Iraq,” (Bumiller, 03-03-03) but Mr. Fox
was

.feeling neglected...” (Bumiller, 03-03-03) and not easily agreeable.
In the articles published in the Times the strong agreement between France,

Russia and Germany was often pointed out and that their position opposed, the United
States regarding a war. But the government heads “.. .agreed ‘to keep open the channels
of communication’,” (Filkins, 03-03-03) though disagreeing with reports that, “’Old
Europe’ to some Bush aides —may have recovered some of that influence today” (Tyler,
03-06-03). “The White House was dismissive of the European statement, saying no
conclusions should be drawn from it about any vote next week on the resolution,”
portraying the “trans-Atlantic split as a dispute among friends” (Tagliabue, 03-06-03).
The Times articles talk about German Chancellor Schroeder’s statements that,
“For Germany, the trans-Atlantic relationship remains a ‘fundamental pillar’ o f its
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foreign policy,” (Tyler, 03-06-03) and that relations “.. .could resume normally after a
war” (McFadden, 03-10-03). While such statements were being reported from leaders of
European countries, “President Bush appeared unconcerned by a rising chorus of protest”
(Tyler, 03-27-03). Though alienating most countries, the alliance with Britain, Spain and
Portugal was reportedly growing stronger.
In the final stages before the beginning of combat, many nations pledged support
in some kind o f way. “Mr. Powell said 45 nations supported the move to disarm Iraq,
including Estonia and Uzbekistan,” (Cowell, 03-19-03) “Poland took the hardest line of
support, pledging 200 troops, most of whom are already in the gulf,” (Cowell, 03-19-03)
and “Czech soldiers would take part only in cleaning up after the use of any chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons” (Cowell, 03-19-03).
Whereas “Hungary's government said it would not send troops or combat units to Iraq,
limiting its support,” (Cowell, 03-19-03) “Canada said it would not allow its troops to
take part in the absence of a new United Nations resolution,” (Stevenson, 03-18-03)
India, China and Mexico were reported to be “.. .in opposition to America's war plans”
(Cowell, 03-19-03). “Australia's government said it would commit a token 2,000 troops,
flying in the face of wide Australian opposition to the deployment” (Cowell, 03-19-03).
“The Berlin government would honor pledges to permit overflights by American planes
and the use of American bases in Germany” (Cowell, 03-19-03).
The New York Times reported that problems are being caused internationally due
to the fact that, “the United States had not shared all the intelligence it has had on Iraq”
(Reuters, 03-12-03). The rough international situation was regretted by some senior
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official, stating that, “There's a recognition this has not been our finest diplomatic hour”
(Sanger & Hoge, 03-14-03). However, one of the latest articles in the data said stated
that, “The Bush administration is pursuing steps to punish France for opposing the United
States on the war in Iraq,” (Bumiller, 04-24-03) clearly not a sign of regretting bad
international relations.

Humanitarian Concerns
In this frame the researcher reports on themes found in New York Times articles
regarding concern for civilian life, humanitarian aid such as food, water, medicine and
schools. It was the fourth most common type of information found in the data and covers
12 % of all codings made.
A number of articles were published discussing war opponents concerns regarding
humanitarian aid. A major concern of theirs was that the beginning of combat would
“ .. .result in Iraqi civilian casualties despite the military's best efforts to prevent them”
(Schmitt & Bumiller, 03-05-03)
The most apparent issue discussed by many in the articles examined is the supply
of food, water and medicine to the Iraqi people. Over the past years, “.. .more than 16
million Iraqis are now dependent on the United Nations' oil-for-food program,” (Tyler,
03-12-03) which would be suspended during a war. Articles suggest, that a “U.S.
intervention is an increase o f humanitarian suffering,” (Tyler, 03-12-03) but to prevent
this, “ .. .Mr. Bush has created a new Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance” (Tyler, 03-12-03). Articles quote President Bush’s speech that
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relief assistance will be

. .a priority of any campaign in Iraq .4America also accepts our

responsibility to protect innocent lives in every way possible,’ he said last week. 4We'll
bring food and medicine to the Iraqi people’” (Santora, 03-13-03). “Relief work will
begin almost as soon as the first bombs are dropped and the military is confronted with
Iraqi civilians in need o f food, water, medicine and shelter, officials said” (Becker, 0318-03).
But aid does not come cheap and the New York Times reported that the “United
Nations World Food Program, which will supply the bulk of the food in the event of a
crisis, has only $7 million of the $23 million requested” (Santora, 03-13-03). In one of
the latest articles in the dataset it was reported, that the “United Nations should resume its
oil-for-food program, in which revenue from sales of Iraqi oil was ostensibly used to buy
food and aid supplies” (Wines, 04-30-03).
Other articles reported on the “ ... shortage of resources...,’’(Santora, 03-13-03)
which makes the aid agencies work harder. “Relief organizations in the region say they
have neither sufficient supplies nor enough money to cope with the millions of injured,
displaced and starving people that could result” (Santora, 03-13-03). The Iraq peoples
own concerns about humanitarian well being triggered reports about people, “ ...stocking
food, water and other supplies; lining up at gasoline stations; mobbing pharmacies for
antibiotics..

(McFadden, 03-17-03) to ensure their own well-being.

But humanitarian concern is also an issue for proponents of the war in Iraq,
emphasizing that “children under the age o f five are now dying at twice the rate they
were a decade ago, according to a United Nations report” (Santora, 03-13-03).
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There were a number o f articles expressing humanitarian concern of the
international community. Chancellor Schroeder of Germany said that President Bush's
decision would mean “certain death to thousands of innocent men, women and children”
(DePalma, 03-19-03). And this is precisely what many articles report - the accidental or
intentional killing of many civilians. “The leaders of Russia, Germany and France noted
that the Geneva Convention binds American and British forces to protect Iraqi civilians
and ensure their humane treatment until order is restored” (Perlez, 04-12-03).
After a higher level of security was reported, there were more and more articles
about “ .. .engineers race(ing) to construct a pipeline to Umm Qasr from Kuwait to relieve
the desperate shortages of drinking water” (Tyler, 03-27-03). It added, towards the end of
official combat, “ ...two-thirds of city (Baghdad) residents ha(d) drinkable water”
(Schmitt & Bumiller, 05-01-03).
But just as many articles reported about the “shortages of food and water” (Tyler,
03-27-03) and that it “ ...might take up to two months before huge shipments of food aid
could be landing once again in Iraq” (Tyler, 03-27-03). It added a majority of households
had “ ...been without electricity and water for a w eek...,” (Bums, 04-08-03) and
“ ...working telephone lines are scarce...” (Bums, 04-08-03). These articles conflict with
a speech, where, “Mr. Rumsfeld said there had been no intelligence to suggest that the
combat had created a humanitarian crisis in Iraq” (Shanker & Bumiller, 03-28-03).
The New York Times reported the “United Nations would play a ‘vital’ but
decidedly advisory role limited to coordination of food, medicine and other relief
supplies” (Schmitt & Weisman, 04-11-03). A number of articles deal with how the
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humanitarian aid will be distributed in Iraq and state, that “ .. .assistance planned by
USAID for Iraq is to be delivered by major American nongovernmental organizations
such as CARE, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps and Save the
Children” as well as the International Red Cross” (Perlez, 04-12-03).

Need to Act
The New York Times also published a significant number of articles, during the
time frame examined, expressing the United States need to act in Iraq. It was the fifth
most common type of information found in the data and covers 9 % of all codings made.
The majority o f this data collected took place between March 1st and March 11th
and only very few times was a justification for the war published after April 1st.
The first messages involved, that, “...Iraq must ‘completely and totally’ disarm
or its leaders must ‘go into exile’” (Sanger, 03-01-03). But other articles stated that,
“New information based on intelligence sources showed that Iraq was making new
rockets even as it was destroying old ones” (Tagliabue, 03-06-03). These are, according
to New York Times articles, reasons for Mr. Powell to dismiss “the inspection process as
ineffective,” (Tagliabue, 03-06-03) stating his case for the necessity for a military
interaction.
Many articles dealt with the administrations need to prevent “the spread of
nuclear arms,” (Weisman & Barringer, 03-06-03) the concern about “diplomacy was
moving toward a showdown,” (Weisman & Barringer, 03-06-03) and the fact that
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“Saddam Hussein has failed to disarm after 12 years of United Nations demands” (Tyler,
03-07-03).
Other reasons for the administration to act in Iraq were reported in the Times
through administration officials who called Saddam Hussein a murderer, who “ ...has
trained and financed A1 Qaeda type organizations,” (Sanger & Barringer, 03-07-03)
which posed an imminent threat to the United States. “ ...Iraq had failed to disarm ...”
(Sanger & Barringer, 03-07-03) and the U.S. government sees this as a “...real threat to
America...” (Unknown, 03-07-03) and Saddam “ .. .Hussein is a threat to the American
people...” (Unknown, 03-07-03) Mr. Powell is reported to have said, that he,
“ .. .believe(s) Saddam Hussein is a threat, is a threat to the American people. He's a threat
to people in his neighborhood. He's also a threat to the Iraqi people” (Unknown, 03-0703) . ”He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has used weapons of mass
destruction” (Unknown, 03-07-03). “Iraq is thought to have produced at least 50 to 75
chemical warheads for ballistic missiles” (Unknown, 03-07-03) as well as “Iraq's
stockpiles of imported or home-built weapons” (Weisman, 03-10-03).
Beginning March 11 , these types o f messages continued to be published in the
New York Times. These statements included reports of “ ...diplomatic failures (which)
may have accelerated the schedule...,” ( Tyler, 03-15-03) the United States has the goal
to “...promote security and elimination o f weapons of mass destruction; the delivery of
humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstruction o f Iraq” (Agence FrancePress, 03-17-03). It added “Our commitment to support the people of Iraq will be for the
long term” (Agence France-Press, 03-17-03).
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Negative connotations were also expressed in this category and the New York
Times did publish such statements. It stated Saddam Hussein, had the potential to one day
assist terrorists in killing “ .. .thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in
our country or any other...,” (Stevenson, 03-18-03) expressing the United States need to
act. The U.S. government is reported to fear “ .. .more wars of aggression against your
neighbors..

(Stevenson, 03-18-03) and promises the Iraqi people

. .no more poison

factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms"
(Sanger, 03-18-03).
There were only four statements published in the New York Times after April 1st
to fit this frame. The articles remind New York Times readers “ . ..that the Iraqi
government possesses weapons o f mass destruction that were never declared,” (Tyler, 0406-03) and about the U.S. governments,’ “...war objectives, - bringing down Mr.
Hussein's government, eliminating any chemical and biological weapons in Iraq,
capturing or driving out terrorists, and helping the people form a ‘representative selfgovernment’” (Rohde, 04-12-03).

Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime
In this frame the author identified all negative statements made about the Iraqi
Regime in the New York Times. It was the least common type o f information found in the
data and covers 6 % o f all codings made.
Journalists o f the New York Times did quote President Bush saying “He's
(Saddam Hussein) a murderer. He has trained and financed A1 Qaeda type organizations”
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(Sanger & Barringer, 03-07-03). One of the speeches reported quoted President Bush
saying that “ ...the tyrant will soon be gone” (Stevenson, 03-18-03). The Times reporters
seemed to have been acutely aware o f the frames in Mr. Bush’s rhetoric, because while
reporting about a speech the author states that President Bush,

. .avoided messianic

language and used the word ‘evil’ only once” (Stanly, 03-18-03).
There were references such as, “Saddam and his group of killers, who have
destroyed a society...,” (The New York Times, 03-07-03) “...replacing this cancer inside
o f Iraq...,” (Unknown, 03-07-03) “...master at deception...,” (Unknown, 03-07-03)
“ . . .reckless aggression and terrible crimes..

(Unknown, 03-07-03) “ . . .brutal

regim e...,” (Sanger, 03-18-03) “...thugs and killers....” (Stevenson, 03-18-03).
Only 27 percent of what has been considered negative talk against the Iraqi
regime for the purpose o f this study was published after April 1st,2003.
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DIE WELT
The coding of the 94 articles in the selected section of Die Welt lead to the
following results. The dominant frames found in Die Welt are “No War - More
Inspections,” “International Relations and U.S.-German Relations,” “The Role of the
United Nations,” “Humanitarian Concerns,” “Legality of the war,” and “Future plans.”
The majority of articles, 28 % of all codings made, examined by the
researcher dealt with the German government’s opposition to a war and its belief that
U.N. inspections were working and should be continued. These were gathered under the
frame of “No War - More Inspections.” The “Role of the United Nations” was
emphasized by many of the newspapers articles dealing with U.N. meetings, discussions
and negotiations among Security Council members. This type o f information covers 21 %
of all codings made. In the frame of “International Relations and U.S.-German
Relations,” a larger portion of the Die Welt coverage, 15 % of codings made, discussed
the effect this war is having on international relations, in particular U.S.-German
relations, which were very much battered during the disagreements about how to handle
Iraq. Under the frame “Humanitarian Concerns, the paper also reported extensively, with
16 % of codings, on the German government’s and the German people’s, concern for the
Iraqi people and how they would be supplied with humanitarian aid, if the United Nations
was not involved in a military intervention in Iraq. This would be the case if the United
Stated decided to go to war without U.N. backing - bringing up the issue that a war
without the United Nations may not be legal according to U.N. Charter. With 7 % of all
codings made, the fifth most common frame of “Legality of the War,” deals with this
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issue. The next common frame found in Die Welt articles, covering also 7 % o f codings
made, is called “Future Plans” and deals with the discussions reported on involving the
future of Iraq and who need to plan who will pay of the reconstruction —will it only be
the U.S. or will the U.N. and other nations help? The least common frame found in the
data derived from Die Welt, covers 6 % o f codings made. “Support by the German
Government” discusses the means the German government was willing to give to the
United States government to support during the war in Iraq.

TABLE 4

M ost Common Frames in Die Welt:

‘Future plans”
7%
“Legality of the
war”
7%
“International
Relations and U.S.German relations”
15%

‘Support from
Germany”
6%

“No War - More
Inspections”
28%

“The Role of the
United Nations”
“Humanitarian
concerns”
16%

21%
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No War - More Inspections
In this frame the statements were presented that criticized the United States and its
“Coalition of the Willing,” for abandoning the inspection process, which in the eyes of
many authors and their sources, were working. This was the most common type of
information found in the data and covers 28 % of all codings made.
Die Welt reported how the German government was very outspoken about its
disapproval of the United States decision going to war without the support by the
international community, especially the United Nations. German government officials
reportedly had the opinion, that the U.N. inspections were working and a peaceful
solution to this conflict was possible and that war should be the last resort. These
statements of the German government, reported in Die Welt, clearly said that under such
circumstances, the German government was not going to contribute to a military
intervention due to the vast risks involved. Articles in Die Welt reported the German
government’s regrets that the war had started in Iraq, and though they were still opposed
to it, they clearly stated that the German government is against a war, but not against the
Americans. The German government also emphasized that they felt there was a peaceful
solution and further inspections might have accomplished this.
Many sources interviewed and reported on in Die Welt called for an extension of
U.N. inspections. The articles stated, that the German people felt the inspections were
working and should not be abandoned.
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The Role of the United Nations
In this frame, Die Welt reported that the German government’s opinion is that it is the
United Nations’ role to ensure the disarmament of Iraq. This was the second most
common type of information found in the data and covers 21 % of all codings made in
the data set collected in Die Welt.
It was reported that the German’s strong position was that a military intervention
by the United States can not be acceptable without the support o f the United Nations. The
German government feared, that with such a step by the U.S., the power of the United
Nations throughout the world will be diminished. The German position emphasized the
United Nations role in the decision making process for international conflicts as well as
political disagreements. According to a number of articles Germany finds the risks of a
military intervention without U.N. approval too risky.
After the beginning o f the military intervention by the United States, Germany
stated that the country starting such a conflict has to carry the major financial obligation
for the country’s reconstruction, but the United Nations will support a large portion of
Iraq’s reconstruction and Germany will contribute its amount to the United Nations. It is
also the German government’s position, that all reconstruction plans must be discussed in
the frame of the United Nations. U.N.-Programs need also to be discussed and organized,
such as the re-activation of the “Oil for Food” program as well as humanitarian aid.
Germany was still undecided about the support of U.N.-peacekeepers once the
situation arose. But no matter what, the German government wanted U.S. and British
troops to remove themselves and let the United Nations take over.
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Humanitarian concerns
Reports about the plans for humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people, and the concern
of the amounts and times the aid would be delivered is gathered in this frame. This was
the third most common type o f information found in the data and covers 16 % of all
codings made.
Die Welt did not report about humanitarian concerns for the Iraqi people, which
would arise through a war, until March 18th when Chancellor Schroeder spoke about his
concern about the well-being o f the Iraqi people.
After the beginning of the war, articles of the German governments concern about
a humanitarian catastrophe surfaced. They carried a great concern for the well being of
the Iraqi people and expressed fear regarding the number of casualties and injuries. The
German government pleaded that living areas, hospitals and water facilities not be
targeted by U.S. and British troops, nor to be used as shields by Saddam Hussein’s
regime.
The German government called for the support by the United Nations to
concentrate their efforts on health and water and waste water issues. Money would be
supported by Germany for these endeavors through the U.N. as well as the European
Unions Help Funds. The German government emphasized that though they voiced a clear
anti-war policy, lots of German help organization, such as the “Deutsche Rote Kreuz”
(German Red Cross) and the “Deutsche Welthungerhilfe” (German World Hunger Help)
were and will be involved to help the Iraqi people.
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International Relations and U.S.-German relations
This frame collected the statement from Die Welt expressing the concern about
the Iraqi war’s influence on international relations, and in particular the relationship
between Germany and the United States. It was the fourth most common type of
information found in the data and covers 15 % of all codings made.
In the articles published in Die Welt, the German government does emphasize
their standpoint against the war, but not against their Allies across the Atlantic. Articles
stated, that due to this conflict, Europe is divided and the transatlantic relationship is
heavily damaged and the relationship between American President Bush and German
Chancellor Schroeder is disrupted. The German government called for working on
improving these relations, since a friendship among these two countries is important and
indispensable. Quoting German President Rau, Die Welt reported that we need a
“dialogue o f cultures,” not a “clash of civilizations” and he did not think that the Bush
administration made it easy for America’s friends to deal with the issue. The German
government wanted to have a U.S.-German relationship based on respect as opposed to
blind following.
According to Die Welt, U.S.-German relations took an even bigger hit, after the
German Chancellor Schroeder, as the rest of the German people, were surprised by the
beginning o f the war in Iraq in the middle of the night, not having even received a phone
call from the American administration. Beginning March 21st, the articles talk about a
non-communication (“radio-silence”) between the two countries.
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In the articles in Die Welt one can clearly see the importance of upholding of
good relations and conversations among Berlin, Paris and Moscow, three of the major
opponents of a war in Iraq. Their ability to express their believes as a unified force
seemed to have made the opposition even stronger and more of an issue in Die Welt.

Legality of the war
This frame deals with the debate the German government staged against a war in
Iraq on the basis of its legality. These messages were scattered throughout all the articles
published in Die Welt during the timeframe examined. It was the fifth most common type
of information found in the data and covers 7 % of all codings made.
In early interviews with Die Welt, German government officials warned the
United States from a military intervention without international support. The Schroeder
administration believed that a military intervention would not agree with the United
Nations Charter and should be considered illegal.
The “Coalition o f the Willing,” was also being considered to be illegal by the
German governments’ interpretations of the United Nations rules and regulations. Such
an action would have serious consequences for the goal of world-peace and international
relations with already critical regions. German officials said that in their eyes a military
intervention would “kick people’s rights with their feet” (“Volkerrecht mit FiiBen
treten”). An article in Die Welt stated experts concerned that a war that could be
considered illegal in the eyes o f the United Nations will become precedent for more wars
to come initiated by the United States or other countries. Another concern, voiced by the
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Schroeder administration in Die Welt, was the developments of international law that
might be an even more serious consequence of the war in Iraq.

Future plans
This frame includes information about what was feared might happen in Iraq after
the war was over. Since the German government was not involved in the planning of the
war, it had no input on plans for the reconstruction phase in Iraq or who the governing
parties would be. In this frame the German newspaper Die Welt does report the concerns
expressed by German officials for the future of Iraq. This was the next most common
type of information found in the data and covers 7 % of all codings made.
In articles shortly after the beginning of the war, the German government pledged
support in the reconstruction o f Iraq and designated billions to help the Iraqi people. But
administration officials also stated that whoever destroys another country through the
means of war needs to carry the main financial burden to rebuild that country. Germany
pledged their support within the duties of the United Nations and NATO, and stated that
the reconstruction needs to be discussed within the U.N..
Government officials did pledge financial support, but also state that with the
money given in the future, German companies have to be involved and given contracts
for the reconstruction process.
Other articles in Die Welt discuss that a large percentage of Germans believe that
the Iraqi people will be better off after the war then under the rule of Saddam’s regime.
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Support by the German Government
The information gather under this frame reflects the statements of support the
German government expressed and were reported by Die Welt. It was the least common
frame determined from the data and covers 6 % of all codings made.
Many articles stated that Germany will not actively be involved in the war but
fulfill its international obligations. These international obligations include the granting of
overflight rights by U.S. military airplanes and German soldiers will guard U.S.
installations as well as civilian buildings on German soil to prevent terrorist acts. The
German government will also allow the United States unlimited usage of its military
installations on German soil, though some German officials interpreted this act to be
against international law. German soldiers will participate in AWACS-Intelligence
Flights over Turkey in correlation with the conflict in Iraq.
Germany pledged billions o f Euros, as well as German companies support, to the
reconstruction. The government did state though that they would only give the minimum
required through the United Nations unless reconstruction contracts go to German
companies as well.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Interpretation of the Research Questions
The United States and German governments utilized their websites well according
to their goals. They were able to each set their own agenda that they wanted the public to
be thinking about.

Whitehouse.gov
The U.S. administration was able to constantly remind the reader of the “awful
regime” in power in Iraq and thai they needed to save the world by means o f a new war.
They were successful gatekeepers by releasing information that seemed to be important
to the government’s agenda and downplaying information that opposed their mission and
therefore framed this conflict in a certain way. The internet seemed to have played a very
important role, because it was a means for the government to directly communicate to its
citizens without media interfering with the messages sent.
The communication published by the United States government on
www.whitehouse.gov clearly displayed the frames of “Need to Act,” “Negative Talk
against Iraqi Regime,” “U.S. as the Savior,” “Future Plans,” “Building Support and
Positive Talk about U.S. Troops,” and “International Involvement.” According to results
of this study the U.S. government used its website www.whitehouse.gov to communicate
crucial information about the war in Iraq in order to gain support.
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The U.S. government’s website served an important role in justifying America’s
invasion or liberation of Iraq. They presented a number o f atrocious facts about Saddam
Hussein’s regime. However, these facts have been known for a number of years and, by
themselves, should not have triggered this war by the American government. This issue
seems very important to the author and has not received very much attention by the
creator of the government’s website. Most of this type of information was released before
the beginning of combat to gather the support of the American public as well as the
international community.
For some of the same reasons, the government released a significant amount of
information containing negative talk about the Iraqi regime. Here they used tactics of
name calling and reported the atrocious tactics the regime used to undermine its people.
These kinds o f messages were used extensively in the communication put out by the U.S.
government.
The administration also released a lot of messages portraying itself as a savior,
even stating that it has to protect its own country, liberate the Iraqi people, and keep the
world safe, through a military intervention. The rhetoric used in these messages is
urgently stating that there were no other options. These messages entailed the vast
promises o f the delivery of humanitarian aid, but most often no mention was made of
who will have to carry the cost of the aid or if other international countries and
international organizations would be involved in its delivery. This kind of communication
goes hand in hand with messages released to build support and talk positive about the
troops. Most of this was done after the beginning of combat to report the good progress
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achieved by the troops, to justify losses, while keeping up the morale of the troops and
supporters in America.
Communication by the administration, intended to release plans for the future
after their mission in Iraq is accomplished, were not very complete. The government only
mentioned its humanitarian aid plans and the administration’s hope for the Iraqi people to
be able to govern themselves, but did not share exact plans on how to achieve this. There
was not as much information present in this frame as in others, which illustrates the
priorities of the administration.
The information about the involvement of the international community is very
limited and does not start until the beginning of combat. Though the British forces had a
major role in this conflict, hardly any mention is being made in the data examined. The
British have also suffered many losses o f soldiers, but none were communicated through
the United States government website. In general the responses of the world community
were not mentioned on the government’s website. All pieces of communication examined
failed to mention the vast international opposition and the impact this disagreement had
on U.S. relations with the international community and the United Nations. The
administration seemed to make a point by excluding all the existing protests. In a speech
transcribed on www.whitehouse.com from March, 27th, 2003, President Bush states that
“We’ve got a huge coalition.” But is this really true?
After identifying and discussing the frames present in the communication by the
government, the researcher can clearly identify the U.S. government’s agenda o f using its
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website www.whitehouse.gov as a Public Relation techniques to gather support for the
war in Iraq.

Bundesregierung.de
The German administration was able to communicate its opposition to the war as
their clear agenda. It, like the American government, was successful gatekeepers in just
releasing information that fit their agenda on its website.
Frames apparent in the communication published by the German Government on
www.bundesregierung.de are “No War - More Inspections,” “Humanitarian Aid,”
“International Relations,” “Support by the German Government,” and “The Role of the
United Nations.” Within these frames the German government discussed its strong
opposition to the war in Iraq and pleaded that more inspections need to be conducted,
since the current inspection were leading the international community to the desired
results - slowly, but they were achievable in the eyes of the German government. Once
the war had begun the majority of information on the German governments’ website was
framed as humanitarian aid concerns for the Iraqi people. This frame showed the worry
about efficient water, food, and electricity supply for the general population. The German
government’s main concern seemed to have been the discontinuation o f the U.N. oil-forfood program, which supplied a majority of humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. Another
major frame apparent in the German government’s publications on its website, was the
concern of what this war would do to the relationships among a multitude of countries.
The opinions about this war were widespread anywhere from full support over some
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support, moral support to total opposition. Due to these different policies, the
relationships among counties suffered strains, which the German government hoped to be
able to repair over time. The discussion about international relations also draws into the
frame o f the United Nations role in this conflict. The German government made it clear
on its website, that it is the administration’s strong belief, that the United States acting
without a U.N. support does not agree with the Charter agreed upon by the international
community. But this frame also emphasizes the United Nation’s potential involvement in
the post-war Iraq as well as it important role of humanitarian assistance.
As could be expected, there were no messages at all found on specific intelligence
presented by the United States that gave them the reasons to go to war and “save” the
people of Iraq. The frame found on www.whitehouse.gov that dealt with the United
States as savior-attitude was also absent.
One of the most interesting findings to the author was that the German
government in one of its publications on March 20th, 2003, pledged to grant overflight
rights and rights for the American military to use airbases located in Germany for its
operations in Iraq. But a “Statement of Support from Coalition” published by the U.S.
government on March 26th excludes Germany from any mention, though other countries,
such as Afghanistan, Georgia or Panama were listed with supplying moral support nothing else. The practice o f agenda-setting becomes apparent through such findings.
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New York Times
The messages of the New York Times could be framed as “The Role of the United
Nations,” “Future plans and Cost,” “International Relations,” “Humanitarian Concerns,”
“Need to Act,” and “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.”
The most common frame found in the articles published in the New York Times
from March 1st until May 1st is the issue of United Nations involvement in the war. The
New York Times thoroughly covered the discussions that took place in Security Council
meetings regarding this issue. The next most common frame of information is the
discussion of Iraq’s future, reconstruction and the costs associated with this. The frame
also includes the discussion about international involvement in the future of a potentially
war-torn country. Further reports about international discussions about Iraq were
gathered in the frame of International Relations. But this frame also includes the
disagreements about the American government’s decision to go to war in Iraq, which
drove a rift between the U.S. and some, mainly European, countries. The frame of
“Humanitarian Concerns” discusses the need and organization of humanitarian aid for the
Iraqi people. In this frame, the author describes conditions reported in the New York
Times, which made Iraqi’s living conditions difficult. Many articles in the New York
Times stated the U.S. government’s need to act, describing conditions under which a
military intervention was needed. This frame included one of the most compelling
statements made by the U.S. government to act in Iraq. The Times extensively reported
on the threat the United States faces through Iraq and its weapons o f mass destruction.
Last but not least, was the frame of “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.” In this
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category all negative statements made about the Iraqi Regime in the New York Times,
which was not a very prominent frame, were gathered, but seemed important to the
author for the course o f this study.
A limited number of messages that did depict the United states as the savior of the
Iraqi people and even the world, as well as messages to praise and motivate the U.S.
military did exist, but not often enough to form a coding category like in the messages
released on www.whitehouse.gov.

D ie Welt
The majority of articles in Die Welt examined by the researcher dealt with the
German government’s opposition to a war and its belief that U.N. inspections were
working and should be continued. A larger portion of the Die Welt coverage discussed
the effect this war is having on international relations, in particular U.S.-German
relations, which were very much battered during the disagreements about how to handle
Iraq. The role of the United Nations was emphasized by many of the newspapers articles
dealing with U.N. meetings, discussions and negotiations among Security Council
members. The papers also reported extensively on the German governments and the
German peoples concern for the Iraqi people and how they would be supplied with
humanitarian aid, if the United Nation was not involved in a military intervention in Iraq.
This would be the case if the United Stated decided to go to war without U.N. backing —
bringing up the issue that a war without the United Nations may not be legal according to
U.N. Charter. The last, but not least common frame found in Die Welt articles dealt with
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the discussions reported on involving the future of Iraq and who needs to plan and pay for
the reconstruction - will it only be the U.S. or will the U.N. and other nations help?
In all 94 articles, phrases that could be coded as the frame “down talk” of the Iraqi
regime was only mentioned three times. These phrases included the comments that
Saddam’s regime is one of the worst in the world, the many people Saddam has already
and will still murder, and how Saddam Hussein disregards decent treatment of his people.

Whitehouse.gov vs. New York Times
This study shows that, in general, the frames found by the U.S. government
publications on www.whitehouse.gov and in articles published in the American
newspaper the New York Times were the same during the data collection period.
Both publications framed information in similar ways. They both mentioned very
extensively the importance of the “Need to Act” where information was publicized about
why the United States needed to turn to a military intervention. This frame talked about
the threats the Iraqi regime brought to the world, its history of brutal mass murder as well
as its possession of weapons o f mass destructions. The difference in coverage can be
found in the importance of the framing. While the “Need to Act” was the most frequent
frame found on www.whitehouse.com, it was only the fifth most common frame in the
articles of the New York Times.
Also used by both publications was the frame o f “Negative Talk about the Iraqi
Regime.” This frame was more extensively found on www.whitehouse.gov, but the same
kind o f information was also reported on in the New York Times.
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Both sources also communicated the administration’s plans for the future as well
as the costs involved in this endeavor. “Future Plans and Costs” was the second most
common frame in the New York Times. “Future Plans” was the fourth most common
frame on www.whitehouse.gov, but the topic of war cost and other costs incurring in the
future was not discussed often enough to consider it to be a frame.
Frames, which the government website and the New York Times discussed
similarly, but not in the same way, are the frames of “International Relations” and
“International Involvement.” The New York Times focused more on the impact this war
has on the relationships among different countries and the United States, while
www.whitehouse.gov concentrated more on the involvement of the international
community in the war in Iraq and who supported them in their efforts.
Frames found in the New York Times, but not on the government’s website, are
the frames of “The Role of the United Nations,” most common frame in the New York
Times, and the “Humanitarian Concerns.”
Frames apparent on www.whitehouse.gov, but not found in the reports of the New
York Times are the frames of “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”
and “U.S. as the Savior,” which were the second and third most common frames
discussed on the governments website.

Bundesregierung.de vs. Die Welt
Comparing the frames found on the German government website
www.bundesregierung.de and in the German newspaper Die Welt, the researcher found,
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that four of the five frames from Die Welt were also present on the website. The frames
“No War - More Inspections,” “International Relations,” “Humanitarian Concerns,” as
well as “The Role of the United Nations” were extensively discussed in both sources. All
four had the same ranking order of most mentioning, where “No War - More
Inspections” was the most common frame, “The Role of the United Nations” was the
second most common issue discussed, followed by “Humanitarian Concerns and
International Relations.”
While the fifth and last frame discussed on www.bundesregierung.de was the
frame called “Support by the German Government,” which dealt with the pledge of
support of certain aspects o f the Iraqi war. The German governments website
www.bundesregierung.de also displayed the frame called “Support by the German
Government,” which discussed all actions taken by the government to support the United
States and its allies. Though some mentioning could be found about this issue in the
newspaper Die Welt, the researcher could not justify creating a frame for it in the Section
of Die Welt.
The frames of “Legality of the War” and “Future Plans” were found in Die Welt,
but hardly on www.bundesregierung.de, certainly not enough to justify creating a frame.
There were two frames found in Die Welt, which were not discussed in detail on
the website of the German government. The newspaper in great detail discussed the legal
issues about entering a war in Iraq without United Nations backing, which is discussed in
the frame “Legality of the War.” Also discussed in Die Welt is the issue of what will
happen in Iraq in the future, how long the United States military would be an occupying
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force, the structure of a new government, the treatment of the Iraqi people, and which
role the United Nations might play later on in the future.
The data shows, that though both sources had slightly different frames and
slightly different agendas, the main issues communicated were the same across the board.

Influence of Previous Literature
As VanSlyke Turk and Franklin (1987) found in their research that agenda-setting
of political news differ internationally, this study confirms these findings. There were
distinct differences found between the agendas of American and German governments, as
well as the coinciding newspapers. The same event was discussed in both countries, but
spun by each government towards the agenda they wanted their citizens to be thinking
about.
The influence a president has on the media’s “coverage of issues on which he is
an important source,” (Wanta & Foote, 1994, p.437) such as international crises was
examined by Wanta and Foote (1994), becomes apparent in the agenda-setting process of
the governments websites. The American, and the German official governmental
websites, were both very much shaped by speeches given by President Bush and
Chancellor Schroeder.
The role the websites played for the U.S. and German governments reinforces
Nedderman, Jones, and Fitzgerald’s (1998) findings, that “CMC may be especially
helpful in making us better democrats, in facilitating the open discourse and the public
policy formation processes associated with democratic institutions” (p. 19). The use of
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their websites gave both the American and German people a better insight in each
governments’ official position and policies. Their agendas and frames were
communicated more effectively on this direct discourse, than through the newspapers,
which distorted the frames slightly.
The five most common frames identified by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) in
U.S. news coverage - Conflict frames, Human interest frames, Economic consequences
frame, Mortality frame, and Responsibility frame - were found in the documents by the
U.S. and German governments as well as the New York Times and Die Welt.
What Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) defined as conflict frames was deliberately
excluded from this particular study, but the Human interest frame can be seen in the
frames defined for this study’s purpose as “Humanitarian Aid” as well as “Future Plans.”
Both o f these frames discussed the concern for the Iraqi people as well as the region and
the world. Their Economic consequences frame in this study was discussed in the frame
o f “Future Plans,” where the concern for the future economic and political situation was
expressed. The Mortality frame discussed by Semetko and Valkenburg, was not part of
the coding process in this study, but could partially be found in the frame of
“Humanitarian Concern,” in which the U.S. and German governments concerns for
civilian casualties among the Iraqi population and mortality issues due to insufficient
humanitarian aid. Just as Semetoko and Valkenburg found that the “Responsibility”
frame was most often used to report political events, in this study the most common
frame used is the “Need to Act” frame. In this section, the American government
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discusses its important role in the world to keep up order and save living environments
for people around the globe.
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Limitations of the Study
In this study the author only looked at the written communication published by
the U.S. and German governments on their websites. The U.S. administration did daily
press conferences, released numerous pictures and video as well as speeches given, which
were not transcribed on the website.
The timeframe of the study could also be a limitation, because taking an extended
to look at the rest of the war, may show whether the frames in the government
publications as well as the newspaper articles changed after May 1st.
The exclusion of Editorials in the two different countries newspapers may have
also excluded interesting information and more opinionated pieces.

Recommendations for Future Research
The author recommends an extension o f the examination of all communication
published by the U.S. and German government, including pictures, interviews, press
conferences, and so on for future research. This extended study of the material might
reveal the usage of specific public relations, publicity, and community relations
techniques. This might fill in the picture of what governments do to set their agenda and
build support from its people.
Another interesting aspect in future research would be to study more than one
newspaper per country to determine if different newspapers within the two countries had
different agendas in reporting about the war in Iraq. Studies could determine whether
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different frames were used by these newspapers and how were the agendas determined
through the different gatekeepers.
Evaluating Editorials or Letters to the Editor regarding this issue would be an
interesting study as well, comparing opinions regarding this issue would ad an interesting
third set of information besides websites and newspapers.
Examining a cross-checker, an independent international publication to determine
a common ground of reporting across the world, would give the international community
a better picture about the general reporting, the agendas and frames across the world.
Future research may also compare the American government’s agendas of its
communication about the war in Iraq in 2003 to the agenda of the American
government’s communication of the Gulf War. It would be interesting to see how the
agendas and frames used a decade ago differ from the agendas and frames used in 2003,
and if it was due to generally different public relation techniques, or due to a different
goal by the government.
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CONCLUSION
This study verified other researchers’ work by finding that the same international
news events do get framed differently in different countries according to their
government’s agenda and the people’s major belief systems.
In both countries the political leader (president or chancellor) had a major impact
on what the agenda of his own administration’s website was, as well as a large impact on
the agenda of the country’s newspapers.
The findings of the exact same first four frames on the German government’s
website www.bundesregierung.de and the first four frames found in Die Welt were
surprising to the author. One can theorize about this occurrence, especially since this
correlation was not found between www.whitehouse.gov and the New York Times.
The results of this study show that the German press is more closely connected to
messages distributed by its government than is the American press to its government.
This may also be a function of the government’s and press’s reflection of the German
public’s opinion. A clear majority of the German people opposed the war in Iraq. The
messages distributed by the German government on its website www.bundesregierung.de
clearly opposed the war in Iraq, which may have lead to the press’s strong theme of
opposition to the war in its articles.
On the American side, comparing the government’s website
www.whitehouse.gov to the New York Times, one can see a clear difference in themes of
message emphasized. As expected, the U. S. government used its website to support a
military invasion of Iraq and removal of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. While the
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New York Times maintained its objective reporting on the important issues surrounding
the controversy o f a war in Iraq.
Let’s consider the opposition in political beliefs among the two countries political
leaders and the two newspapers. German Chancellor Schroeder could be considered
liberal and Die Welt is said to be more conservative, whereas the U.S. President Bush is
conservative and the New York Times is a more liberal newspaper. It seems obvious, that
though wanting to believe in these newspapers impartiality and objectivity, the New York
Times liberal views would disagree with a conservative presidents policies and agenda’s
set by his administration. But I believe in the objective reporting of the New York Times
and that they developed their agenda and frames according to how the Times editors and
reporters saw the importance of news stories regarding this conflict.
The reasons why the frames of www.bundesregierung.de and Die Welt were so
similar is more difficult to explain. One might be inclined to say that Die Welt follows
government political beliefs more closely than the New York Times. But I believef it has
more to do with the German government representing the major opinion of the German
people. A clear majority of German people opposed the war in Iraq. This majority
pressured the German government to represent a line in international politics, by
speaking up against a military intervention, but more U.N. inspections. Since this was the
dominant opinion across the nation, Die Welt picked up this agenda in its reports and the
articles fit in the frames the German government also had. It is reassuring to see, that the
author could determine three more frames for Die Welt which were not found in this way
on www.bundesregierung.de. This makes the reporting more independent, meaning, the
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reporters o f Die Welt did not just follow the German government’s publications, but
extended their reporting to other topics.
Public Opinion Polls in both countries do represent the coverage on the U.S. and
German governments’ websites well. Whereas the German public opinion polls showed a
rising popularity of the German Chancellor Schroeder and his opposition to a war in Iraq
without United Nations backing, American public opinion polls expressed the still high
popularity of President Bush and his expression of the need to go to war in Iraq. During
the course of this war the stance Chancellor Schroeder took did increase his popularity
with the German public, whereas the positive American public opinion on President Bush
declined throughout the course of this international crisis.
Newspapers and other means o f media often use government sources for the their
political reporting. The Internet has made it much easier for these media to receive
information about government policies and stances. Reporters don’t have to talk to
someone to know what the government says about a certain event or issue. With official
government websites such as www.whitehouse.gov and www.bundesregierung.de, media
can also more quickly determine a governments agenda through determining the frames
present.
In conclusion, while following international political events it might be useful to
rely on more than one source of information. By relying only on the information a
government website supplies, the interested party may be faced with certain frames and a
certain agenda. By only following one newspaper’s or one type of media’s coverage of an
important event such as a war, the consumer of the news is only exposed to one type of
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framing of an event. Being more diverse in ones choice of news coverage, a very
different picture o f the event might be presented.
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APPENDIX A

Rank order o f most common frames on www.whitehouse.gov:
1. “Need to Act”
2. “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”
3. “U.S. as the Savior”
4. “Future Plans”
5. “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime”
6. “International Involvement”

Rank order o f most common frames on www.bundesregierung.de:
1. “No War - More Inspections”
2. “The Role of the United Nations”
3. “Humanitarian Aid”
4. “International Relations”
5. “Support by the German Government”

Rank order of most common frames in the New York Times:
1. “The Role o f the United Nations”
2. “Future plans and Cost”
3. “International Relations”
4. “Humanitarian Concerns”
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5. “Need to Act”
6. “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime”

Rank order of most common frames in Die Welt:
1. “No War - More Inspections”

2. “The Role o f the United Nations”
3. “Humanitarian concerns”
4. “International Relations and U.S.-German relations'
5. “Legality of the war”
6. “Future plans”
7. “Support from Germany”
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APPENDIX B
www.whitehouse.gov articles used in this Study:
Mar. 1, 2003
President's Radio Address
Mai . 4, 2003
President's Remarks to American Medical Association
Mar. 6, 2003
Global Message on Iraq
Mar. 7, 2003
Global Message
Secretary Powell's Remarks at U.N. Security Council Meeting
Mar. 8, 2003
President's Radio Address
Mar. 11,2003
Global Message
Mar. 12, 2003
Global Message
Mar. 14, 2003
Global Message
Mar. 16, 2003
President Bush: Monday "Moment of Truth" for World on Iraq
Statement of the Atlantic Summit: Commitment to Transatlantic Solidarity
Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People
Mar. 17, 2003
Global Message
Presidential Remarks
Mar. 19, 2003
President Bush Addresses the Nation
Global Message
Mar. 20, 2003
Cabinet Meeting
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Mar. 21, 2003
President Thanks Congressional Leaders
Global Message
Mar. 22, 2003
President's Radio Address
Mar. 23, 2003
President Bush Discusses Military Operation
Mar. 24, 2003
Global Message
Mar. 25, 2003
President to Submit Wartime Budget
Mar. 26, 2003
President Rallies Troops at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa
Global Message
Our Coalition
Statement of Support from Coalition
Mar. 27, 2003
President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Availability
Global Message
Coalition Members
Mar. 28, 2003
Global Message
Mar. 29, 2003
President Discusses Iraqi Freedom Progress in Radio Address
Mar. 31,2003
President Updates America on Operations Liberty Shield and Iraqi Freedom
Global Message
Apr. 2, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 3, 2003
President Discussed Operation Iraqi Freedom at Camp Legeune
Global Message

101

Apr. 4, 2003
Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq Reconstruction
Global Message
Fact Sheet
Apr. 5, 2003
Global Message
President's Radio Address
Apr. 8, 2003
Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Meeting between President Bush and PM Blair
Global Message
Joint Statement by President Bush, Prime Minister Blair on Iraq's Future
Apr. 9, 2003
Vice President Cheney Salutes Troops
Global Message
Apr. 10, 2003
President's Message to the Iraqi People
Global Message
Apr. 11,2003
President Visits Soldiers at Army and Navy Medical Centers
Global Message
Apr. 12, 2003
Global Message
President's Radio Address
Apr. 14, 2003
President's Message to America's Military and Their Families
Global Message
Apr. 15, 2003
President's Remarks on Iraq from the Rose Garden
Global Message
Apr. 16, 2003
President Bush Outlines Progress in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Humanitarian Update
Global Message
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Apr. 17, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 18, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 20, 2003
President Meets with Former U.S. POWs
Apr. 21, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 22, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 23, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 24, 2003
President Gives Iraq Update to Workers of Tank Plant in Lima, Ohio
Global Message
Apr. 25, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 28, 2003
President Discusses the Future o f Iraq
Global Message
Apr. 29, 2003
Global Message
Apr. 30, 2003
Global Message
May 1, 2003
President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended
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APPENDIX C
www.bundesregierung.de articles used in this Study:
3. March 2003
Interview with Federal Minister Wieczorek-Zeul in Berliner Zeitung
4. March 2003
Policy statement by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on the international situation
and on the results of the Brussels European Council
Iraqi cooperation showing progress and deficits
6. March 2003
For peaceful disarmament - against the use of force
10. March 2003
Fischer: Noticeable improvement in Iraqi cooperation
11. March 2003
Schroeder welcomes French proposal for heads of state and government to be present at
U.N. Security Council vote
14. March 2003
“Courage for peace and courage for change”
17. March 2003
Fighting for peace - averting war
Joint French-Russian-German statement on Iraq
18. March 2003
Schroeder: War against Iraq not justified
Statement by Chancellor Schroeder on the Iraq crisis
19. March 2003
A clear policy for the outset: peaceful disarmament of Iraq
Schroeder: Middle East needs new peace, not new war
Schroeder says military intervention in Iraq would be a mistake
Chancellor Schroeder reaffirms his rejection of military action in Iraq
Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder welcomes Security Council resolution on
Iraq
Overflight and transit rights for possible military intervention against Iraq
Schroeder: War must never be inevitable
Schroeder calls for more time for U.N. weapons inspectors
Schroeder notes growing approval of his government’s stance on Iraq
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Schroeder: Iraq conflict should be resolved by U.N. Security Council
Statement by government spokesman, Bela Anda, on declaration by eight
European heads of state and government
Schroeder and Putin reaffirm common views on Iraq
There is still an alternative to war
Disarming Iraq without war
European Union calls for peaceful disarmament o f Iraq
Memorandum
Schroeder and Putin: Iraq must be disarmed peacefully
20. March 2003
Schroeder: No new parliamentary mandate needed for AWACS flights over Turkey
21. March 2003
German government regrets failure o f efforts to achieve peaceful resolution o f conflict
24. March 2003
Statement of the Federal Government on Turkey’s possible entry into the war
German AWACS crews to be withdrawn if Turkey enters war with Iraq
31. March 2003
Humanitarian aid for the people in Iraq
Assisting the Iraqi population
6. April 2003
Chancellor Schroeder in a ZDF interview with Ruprecht Eser
7. April 2003
A just society under changed conditions
8. April 2003
Stabilization of Iraq under the aegis of the United Nations
10. April 2003
Schroeder welcomes signs that war may be over soon
11. April 2003
Germany can and will be involved in a reconstruction effort under U.N. leadership
13. April 2003
Reconstruction of Iraq under U.N. leadership
16. April 2003
Schroeder and Blair agreed on key role for U.N. in reconstruction of Iraq
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22. April 2003
Under the umbrella of the United Nations, with a strong Europe
24. April 2003
U.N. oil-for-food program to be extended briefly
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APPENDIX D
New York Times articles used in this Study:

1. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Baghdad; Experts See High Risk Of Strife In Iraq If Hussein Is
Deposed
Threats And Responses: Moscow; Putin Again Rejects U.S. Calls For Support Of A War,
Fearing Effect On The Mideast
Putin Today Rebuffed American Calls
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; New Element In Iraq's Mix
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy;
3. March 2003
Threats And Responses: The Turks; Turkey Will Seek A Second Decision On A G.I.
Presence
Threats And Responses: The Opposition; Ending Conference, Iraqi Dissidents Insist On
Self-Government
Threats And Responses: The Outlook; A Stalwart Of Certainty: Bush Undeterred On Iraq
White House Letter; Two Presidential Pals, Until 9/11 Intervened
5. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Attack Strategy; Top General Sees Plan To Shock Iraq Into
Surrendering
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; Powell Says U.S. Can Wage War On Iraq Without
Turks
6. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Protests; Students Skip Class For Peace (And Frisbee)
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; A Deepening Fissure
Threats And Responses: Military Options; Pentagon Ready To Strike Iraq Within Days If
Bush Gives The Word, Officials Say
Threats And Responses: Blunt Diplomacy; Powell Attacks Validity Of The Work By
Weapons Inspectors In Iraq
Threats And Responses: Discord; France And Russia Ready To Use Veto Against Iraq
War
Threats And Responses: Baghdad; Iraq's Two Faces Of War: Armed, Ready, Yet In A
Mood To Disarm
7. March 2003
Threats And Responses; Excerpts From Bush's News Conference On Iraq And
Likelihood Of War
Threats And Responses; Outsiders Will Be Given Time To Leave Iraq
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Threats And Responses: The President; President Readies U.S. For Prospect Of Imminent
War
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; A Reminder Of A Missio
Threats And Responses: Pakistan; Musharraf Facing Decision In The Security Council
Soon
8. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Public Opinion; Sentiment Against War Is Voiced Across World
Threats And Responses: Congress; Senate Republicans Back Bush's Iraq Policy, As
Democrats Call It Rash And Bullying
Threats And Responses: An Overview ~ March 8, 2003; Squabbling Diplomats, A Mixed
Report Card From Iraq And A Ticking Clock
Threats And Responses: United Nations; U.N. Split Widens As Allies Dismiss Deadline
On Iraq
Threats And Responses: Congress; Senate Republicans Back Bush's Iraq Policy, As
Democrats Call It Rash And Bullying
10. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Turkey; Once Banned, A Turkish Leader Is Elected And
Revives U.S. Hopes For Access
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 9, 2003; Diplomatic Lobbying, A Growing
Gap In Britain And Protests Pro And Con
Threats And Responses: Security Council; Urgent Diplomacy Fails To Gain U.S. 9 Votes
In The U.N.
Threats And Responses: Intelligence; U.S. Asks Over 60 Nations To Expel Iraqi Envoys
Threats And Responses: Inspections; U.S. Says Iraq Retools Rockets For Illicit Uses
Candidates Find Agendas Eclipsed By Antiwar Questions
11. March 2003
Threats And Responses: The Poll; More Americans Now Faulting U.N. On Iraq, Poll
Finds
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; U.S. Says U.N. Could Repeat Errors Of 90's
Threats And Responses: United Nations; Annan Says U.S. Will Violate Charter If It Acts
Without Approval
Threats And Responses: Military; Allied Plan Would Encourage Iraqis Not To Fight
Threats And Responses: Inspections; U.S. Says Blix Played Down Details Of Banned
Weapons
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 10, 2003; Support At Home But Not In
France, Battle Plans And Basketball
Threats And Responses: Discord; France To Veto Resolution On Iraq War, Chirac Says
12. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Postwar Plans; Panel Faults Bush On War Costs And Risks
U.S. Lays Siege To Mexico's Chief, And So Do Many Others

108

Threats And Responses: Washington; U.S. Would Accept Short Extension Of Iraq
Deadline
Threats And Responses: Postwar Plans; Panel Faults Bush On War Costs And Risks
Threats And Responses: Berlin; Germany Hoping For Return Of Strong American Bond
Threats And Responses: Washington Talk; An Order Of Fries, Please, But Do Hold The
French
Threats And Responses: Turkey; Erdogan, Turkish Party Leader, To Form Government
As U.S. Presses For Use Of Bases
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 11, 2003; A Postponed Deadline, A
Beleaguered Blair And De-Frenched Fries
Threats And Responses; U.S. Diplomat Quits Job Over Iraq Policy
13. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Iraqi Weapons; Iraq Shows One O f Its Drones, Recalling Wright
Brothers
Threats And Responses: Postwar Plans; Not Enough Supplies Or Money, Relief Groups
Say
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 12, 2003; Trolling For U.N. Votes (8
Enough?), Terms For Delay, Drones On Display
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; Canvassing The Votes To Gain Legitimacy
Threats And Responses: 101st Airborne; Ears Cocked To The U.N., G.I.'S Watch And
Wait
Threats And Responses: London; For Blair, A Gamble To Avoid Political Disaster
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; U.S. Still Hopeful O f 9 Votes At U.N. For Iraq
Measure
14. March 2003
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 13, 2003; Stalled Diplomacy, Speedup In
War Preparations And A Wall Street Rally
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; U.S. May Abandon U.N. Vote On Iraq, Powell
Testifies
Threats And Responses: Liberals For War; Some Of Intellectual Left's Longtime Doves
Taking On Role Of Hawks
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 13, 2003; Stalled Diplomacy, Speedup In
War Preparations And A Wall Street Rally
15. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Britain; Bush's Middle East Move Gives Hard-Pressed Blair
Some Badly Needed Relief
Threats And Responses: The Future; White House Approves A Plan To Administer A
Postwar Iraq
Threats And Responses: White House; Bush And Allies Will Meet To Seek Ways To
Sway U.N.
Threats And Responses: An Overview —March 14, 2003; A 3-Way Huddle, Mideast

109

Promises And Early Warning Pigeons
Threats And Responses: American Jews; Divide Among Jews Leads To Silence On Iraq
War
17. March 2003
Threats And Responses; The Leaders' Two Declarations: 'We Uphold A Vision O f
International Security'
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 16, 2003; An Ultimatum, Frayed French
Relations And Stockpiling In Iraq
Threats And Responses; Excerpts From Joint News Conference: 'Tomorrow Is A
Moment O f Truth'
Threats And Responses: Talk Shows; Two Disciples Spread Word: The End Is Near
Threats And Responses: Protests; Candlelight Vigils Are Held Around The World To
Oppose Military Action Against Iraq
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; Bush And 2 Allies Seem Set For War To Depose
Hussein
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 16, 2003; An Ultimatum, Rayed French
Relations And Stockpiling In Iraq
Threats And Responses: Paris; France Seeks Compromise To Prevent U.N. Rupture
Threats And Responses: Defenses; Iraq's Air Defense Is Concentrated Around Baghdad
Threats And Responses: Foreign Policy; A Long, Winding Road To A Diplomatic Dead
End
18. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Occupation; U.S. Business Will Get Role In Rebuilding
Occupied Iraq
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; Europeans Still Seek A Solution To Avert War
Threats And Responses; Bush's Speech On Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein And His Sons Must
Leave'
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; A New Doctrine For War
Threats And Responses: Military Plans; Allies Will Move In, Even If Saddam Hussein
Moves Out
Threats And Responses: Strategy; Allies Hope To Move Quickly To Seize City In Iraq's
South
Threats And Responses: Tv Watch; Soft Words That Convey A Hard Line
Threats And Responses: The President; Bush Gives Hussein 48 Hours, And Vows To Act
Threats And Responses: Congress; Both Parties Close Ranks Behind The President
Threats And Responses: The President's Day; Just Another Monday, Except For Its
Conclusion
19. March 2003
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 18, 2003; Defiance From Baghdad, Troops
On The Move, And Security Warnings
Threats And Responses: Reporter's Notebook — 101st Airborne Division; Making A
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Shaving Mug And Other Survival Tricks
Threats And Responses: The Troops; War Imminent As Hussein Rejects Ultimatum
Threats And Responses: Disarming Saddam Hussein; Teams O f Experts To Hunt Iraq
Arms
Threats And Responses: World Reaction; A Worried World Shows Discord
Threats And Responses: Immigration; New Asylum Policy Comes Under Fire
Sibling Cities Issue A Plea For Decency Toward Frites
Letter From Europe; Germans Balk At The Price O f Economic Change
Threats And Responses: The Defense Secretary; Rumsfeld Seeks Consensus Through
Jousting
20. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Articles O f Capitulation; Iraqis Told, 'Sign Here' To Surrender —
As Lee Did
Threats And Responses: Desert Front; In Day Of Waiting, First Surrenders And The First
Missile Attack
Threats And Responses: United Nations; Critics Say U.S. Lacks Legal Basis For Attack
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 19-20, 2003; Starting A War, Appealing
For Surrender And Pulling Out The Networks
Threats And Responses: Paying For Defense; Bush Administration To Seek Emergency
Money To Protect Against Terrorist Attacks In U.S.
Threats And Responses; Bush's Speech On The Start Of War
Threats And Responses: A Command Post; Reluctant Saudi Arabia Prepares Its Quiet
Role In The U.S.-Led War On Iraq
Threats And Responses: The Decision; Day Of Waiting And Wondering Ends With
Word From President
Threats And Responses: Military Analysis; Setting The Stage
Threats And Responses: The White House; Bush Orders Start O f War On Iraq; Missiles
Apparently Miss Hussein
Threats And Responses: Ankara; Turkey Limits Military Help To U.S. On Iraq
21. March 2003
A Nation At War: World Reaction; Wave Of Protests, From Europe To New York
A Nation At War: The Attack; U.S. And British Troops Push Into Iraq As Missiles Strike
Baghdad Compoun
A Nation At War: Pressure On Iraq; U.S. Reports Talks Urging Surrender
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Surprise Strike At Outset Leaves Urgent Mystery: Who Was
Hit?
22. March 2003
A Nation At War: Airstrikes; Aerial Pounding Intended To Push Iraq's Government
Toward Brink
A Nation At War: The Poll; Support For Bush Surges At Home, But Split Remains
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23. March 2003
A Nation At War: The Strategy; U.S. Says The Iraqis Are Repositioning Their Missile
Sites
24. March 2003
A Nation At War: News Analysis; Lowering Expectations
A Nation At War: The Attack; Allies And Iraqis Battle On 2 Fronts; 20 Americans Dead
Or Missing, 50 Hurt
A Nation At War: The Iraqi Capital; As Allied Troops Race North, Iraq Warns O f A
Fierce Clash
A Nation At War: The Strategy; In Crucial Step, U.S. Starts Push Near Baghdad
25. March 2003
A Nation At War:
In South
A Nation At War:
Expenses
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:

The Southern Front; Marines, Battling In Streets, Seek Control O f City
White House; Bush Is Requesting Nearly $75 Billion For War
The Iraqi Capital; Hussein Rallies Iraqi Defenders To Hold Capital
Military Analysis; The Goal Is Baghdad, But At What Cost?

26. March 2003
A Nation At War: The Strategy; U.S. Shifting Focus O f Land Campaign To Fight In
South
A Nation At War: Combat; Heavy Iraqi Losses Seen In Big Battle
27. March 2003
Hands Out For Shares Of War Budget
A Nation At War: Military Analysis; Allies Adapt To Setbacks
A Nation At War: In The Field Third Division; Fierce Clashes, Fireflghts And Wire
Prisons
A Nation At War: In The Field The Marines; Iraqi Soldiers Say It Was Fight Or Die
A Nation At War: The Northern Front; 1,000 U.S. Paratroopers Open Northern Front
A Nation At War: The Iraqi Capital; Blasts In Baghdad
Canadians O f Two Minds Over Neighbor To The South
28. March 2003
A Nation At War: Heads O f Government; War To Keep Going Until Regime Ends, Bush
And Blair Say
29. M arch 2003
A Nation At War: The Attack; Airstrikes Continue As Allies Consider Timing O f A
Thrust
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A Nation At War: The Iraqi Captial; Iraq Blames U.S. For Market Blast That Killed
Civilians In Baghdad
30. March 2003
A Nation At War:
Abandoned
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:

In The Field The Northern Front; Militants Gone, Caves In North Lie
The Attack; Taxi Suicide Blast Kills 4 Americans In New Iraq Tactic
Baghdad; Iraqis Threatening New Suicide Strikes Against U.S. Forces
News Analysis; Bush Peril: Shifting Sand And Fickle Opinion,

31. March 2003
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Iraqi General Says 4,000 Volunteered For Suicide Attacks
A Nation At War: In The Field Third Infantry Division; Anger And Warning After
Suicide Bomb
A Nation At War: Washington; Calling Troop Levels Adequate, Rumsfeld Defends War
Planning
1. April 2003
A Nation At War: In The Field First Marine Division; Marines Move Into 'Bad Guy'
Land
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Warning Of Doom, Edgy Iraqi Leaders Put On Brave Front
A Nation At War: Strategy; A New Doctrine's Test
2. April 2003
A Nation At War: Prisoners O f War; Commandos Rescue Soldier; She Was Held Since
Ambush
A Nation At War: The Strategy; U.S. Forces Enter Zone To Confront Republican Guard
A Nation At War: Combat; Iraq Is Planning Protracted War
3. April 2003
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
Surge Over River
A Nation At War:

In The Field 101st Airborne; A Bridgehead, And A Thirsty Welcome
Strategy; Goal O f U.S.: Avoid A Siege
In The Field Third Infantry Division; G.I.'S Pry Iraqis Loose And
Combat; U.S. Ground Forces Sweep Toward Baghdad

4. April 2003
Chirac Apologizes For Vandalized Graves
Spanish Premier's Support For War Is Hurting Him Politically
A Nation At War: A Capital's Plight; A Capital's Plight
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Forces At Edge Of A Blacked-Out Baghdad
A Nation At War: In The Field March To Baghdad; At Airport, Bombs Provide The Only
Light
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5. April 2003
A Nation At War: The Central City; As U.S. Moves In, Iraqi Tv Presents A Relaxed
Hussein
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Squeezes Baghdad And Readies Next Step
A Nation At War: News Analysis; Dash To Baghdad Leaves Debate In Dust
6. April 2003
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
Into Baghdad

Military Analysis; Showing Flag, Testing Foe
Baghdad; Defiant Iraqis Say U.S. Push Was Thwarted
Combat; A Show O f Force
In The Field Third Infantry Division; U.S. Tanks Make Quick Strike

7. April 2003
Congressional Memo; What Price War? It's Too Soon To Tell, But Expect The Final Tab
To Be High
A Nation At War: Postwar Planning; Transition Plans
A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Strike In Baghdad And Press Into Basra
A Nation At War: In The Field 101st Airborne Division; A Sinister Past Comes To Light
At An Iraqi Post
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Dissonance O f Guns Heralds Ground War In Iraq's Capital
Congressional Memo;What Price War? It’s Too Soon To Tell, But Expect The Final Tab
To Be High
A Nation At War: Postwar Planning; Transition Plans
8. April 2003
A Nation At War: In The Field First Marine Division; Warm Welcome And Stubborn
Resistance For Marines
A Nation At War: The President; Bush Meets Blair
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Blasts Compound In Effort To Kill Hussein
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Capital Has Look O f A Battlefield
After The War
9. April 2003
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Tightens Grip; Rockets Rain On Baghdad
A Nation At War: The President; Bush Sees Aid Role Of U.N. As Limited In Rebuilding
Iraq
A Nation At War: Iraqi Capital; Key Section Of City Is Taken In A Street-By-Street
Fight
A Nation At War: News Analysis; Bush's War Message: Strong And Clear
A Nation At War: Strategy; Push To Finish The Job
10. April 2003
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2 Allies To Prod Bush On Plan For The Mideast
A Nation At War: Washington; Bush Tunes In And Sees Iraqis In Celebrations
A Nation At War: Tumult; Cheers, Tears And Looting In Capital's Streets
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Forces Take Control In Baghdad; Bush Elated; Some
Resistance Remains
A Nation At War: The Plan; Speed And Flexibility
11. April 2003
A Nation At War: The Desert; Heavy Fighting For Desert Base At Syria Border
A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Widen Hold On Iraq; Civil Strife On Rise
A Nation At War: News Analysis; A High Point In 2 Decades Of U.S. Might
12. April 2003
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
Deaths
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:

Iraqi Capital; In Baghdad, Free Of Hussein, A Day Of Mayhem
Mosul; Sniper Fire Greets G.I.'S In Big City In North
Military Analysis; Seeking Calm In The Chaos

13. April 2003
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:

Civil Authority; Military Begins Screening Iraqis For New Rule
Military Analysis; Last Symbol: Tikrit Capture
Marines; U.S. Troops Move To Restore Order In Edgy Baghdad
In The Field Third Infantry Division;

Relief; Aid Groups Urging Military To Protect Essential Services
Civilian Casualties; G.I. Who Pulled The Trigger Shares Anguish O f 2

14. April 2003
A Nation At War : Combat; U.S. Troops Poised To Oust Loyalists In Northern City
A Nation At War : Freedom; Marines Discover 7 P.O.W.'S In Town North Of Baghdad
A Nation At War : The Iraqi Capital; Baghdad Residents Begin A Long Climb To An
Ordered City
15. April 2003
A Nation At War: The Streets; G.I.'S And Iraqis Patrol Together To Bring Order
A Nation At War: The Postwar Task; U.S. Overseer Set To Remake Iraq
A Nation At War: Military; Pentagon Asserts The Main Fighting Is Finished In Iraq
16. April 2003
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
Its Own
A Nation At War:
Clerics
A Nation At War:

Baghdad; Free To Protest, Iraqis Complain About The U.S.
The Stronghold; Tale O f Hussein's Last Sighting Takes On A Life O f
Conference; Pledge Made To Democracy By Exiles, Sheiks And
White House; Bush Says Regime In Iraq Is No More; Syria Is
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Penalized
European Union's Expansion Is Overshadowed By Disarray
17. April 2003
A Nation At War: Recovery; Bush Urging U.N. To Lift Sanctions Imposed On Iraq
A Nation At War: Recovery7; Bush Urging U.N. To Lift Sanctions Imposed On Iraq
18. April 2003
A Nation At War: Military; U.S. Captures A Half Brother Of Iraqi Chief
A Nation At War: Reconstruction; U.S. Gives Bechtel A Major Contract In Rebuilding
Iraq
19. April 2003
A Nation At War: Rebuilding; Bush Plans To Ask U.N. To Lift Penalties Against Iraq In
Phases
20. April 2003
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:
Nation
A Nation At War:
Bases
A Nation At War:
A Nation At War:

The Defense Secretary; After The War, New Stature For Rumsfeld
Reconstruction; From Power Grid To Schools, Rebuilding A Broken
Strategic Shift; Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access To Key Iraq
Baghdad Diary; Last, Desperate Days O f A Brutal Reign
Baghdad; Back At Work, Iraqis Discover Offices In Chaos

21. April 2003
Aftereffects: President; Bush Now Says He Believes Syria Wants To Cooperate
Aftereffects: Most Wanted; Hussein's Last Son-In-Law Gives Himself Up To U.S. Forces
Aftereffects: Prohibited Weapons; Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve O f War, An Iraqi Scientist
Is Said To Assert
Aftereffects: Assessment; Baghdad's Power Vacuum Is Drawing Only Dissent
Aftereffects: President; Bush Now Says He Believes Syria Wants To Cooperate
22. April 2003
Aftereffect: Baghdad; U.S. Overseer Vows Quick Restoration O f Iraq's Services
23. April 2003
Aftereffects: The Iraqis; As Baghdad Waits For Aid, Passions Rise In The South
Aftereffects: The Search
Aftereffects: The Interim Leader; American Overseer In Iraq Returns To A Kurdish Zone
Aftereffects: United Nations; France Urging U.N. To Suspend Iraq Penalties
24. April 2003
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Aftereffects: Retaliation; U.S., Angry At French Stance On War, Considers Punishment
Aftereffects: In Custody; Four More Officials Are Captured, Two Of Them Intelligence
Agents
Aftereffects: The Search; U.S.-Led Forces Occupy Baghdad Complex Filled With
Chemical Agents
Aftereffects: Strategy; U.S. Tells Iran Not To Interfere In Iraq Efforts
Aftereffects: Reconstruction; U.S. Warns Iraqis Against Claiming Authority In Void
Aftereffects: Retaliation; U.S., Angry At French Stance On War, Considers Punishment
Aftereffects: Washington; Under Fire, Powell Receives Support From White House
Aftereffects: Hussein's Rule; Iraqis Tell Of A Reign Of Torture .And Maiming
25. April 2003
Aftereffects: United Nations; Security Council Votes To Extend Oil-For-Food Plan In
Iraq
Aftereffects: Weapons; Specialists Deploying To Disable Any Arms
Aftereffects: Paris; France Works To Limit Damage From U.S. Anger
26. April 2003
Aftereffects: Iraqi Officials; Rumsfeld Says Prisoners Are Providing Useful Data
28. April 2003
Aftereffects: Natural Resources; Iraqis Anxiously Await Decisions About The Operation
And Control Of The Oil Industry
Aftereffects: Forbidden Arms; Franks Foresees A Weapons Hunt At 'Several Thousand
Sites'
Aftereffects: Hometown; Hussein Birthplace Uneasy On The Eve Of His Birthday
Aftereffects: Bases; U.S. Will Move Air Operations To Qatar Base
Aftereffects: Baghdad; Americans Arrest Would-Be Leader Of Iraq's Capital
29. April 2003
Aftereffects: Policy; American Forces And Terror Group Reach Cease-Fire
30. April 2003
Blair And Putin Discuss Iraq. But There's No Meeting Of Minds
Aftereffects: Reconstruction; U.S. Tells Iraq Oil Ministers Not To Act Without Its O.K.
Aftereffects: Manhunt;
Aftereffects: Strategy; U.S. Planning To Regroup Armed Forces In Baghdad, Adding To
Military Police
Aftereffects: Policy; U.S. Reported To Push For Iraqi Government, With Pentagon
Prevailing
Aftereffects: The Military; U.S. Force Said To Kill 15 Iraqis During An Anti-American
Rally
Aftereffects: Nato; 4-Nation Plan For Defense Of Europe
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Aftereffects: Policy; U.S. Reported To Push For Iraqi Government, With Pentagon
Prevailing
1. May 2003
Aftereffects: Violence; G.I.'S Kill 2 More Protesters In An Angry Iraqi City
Aftereffects: Iraq; Rumsfeld Visits 2 Cities In Iraq, Meeting Troops
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APPENDIX E
Die Welt articles used in this Study:
I. March 2003
„Lenkt Saddam nicht ein, muss er gestiirzt werden"
Prestigeprojekt vor dem Aus
4. March 2003
Et hat noch imme joot jejange
Regierung bewertet irakische Abriistung zuriickhaltend
5. March 2003
"Letztlich ist Gewalt nur durch Gewalt zu beseitigen"
6. March 2003
Grtine Novizen und barocke BuBfertigkeit
Die groBe Polit-Gaudi II
8. March 2003
Uberflugsrechte: Bei einem U.S.-Schlag droht Streit in der Koalition
Unionspolitiker auf dem Weg nach Bagdad
Rau fordert friedliche Losung des Irak-Konflikts
10. March 2003
"Nabelschau gehort nicht zu meinen Hobbys"
Verfassungsschutz wamt vor Racheakten
Die Woche der Entscheidungen
"Die Hemmschwelle sinkt"
II. March 2003
Treiben Paris, Berlin und Moskau die USA zu Alleingang?
Greenpeace besetzt das Brandenburger Tor
12. March 2003
Gauweiler und Wimmer berichten im Vatikan liber Bagdad-Reise
Mahnminuten gegen Irak-Krieg
Bischofe wamen Bush vor "gefahrlichem Spiel"
Die Entscheidung des U.N.-Sicherheitsrates
15. March 2003
Deutsche Bischofe: Auch Saddam Hussein ist bose
Irak-Krise: Auswartiges Amt gibt verscharfte Reisewamung heraus
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17. March 2003
Bundesregierung will Botschaft in Iraks Hauptstadt Bagdad schliefien
Friedensdemonstration: 100 000 Menschen bei Lichterkette in Berlin
18. March 2003
Schroders Dilemma
Schroder spricht Bush jede Rechtfertigung fur Irak-Krieg ab
Berlin vor dem Kricg
19. March 2003
"Ausmafi der Bedrohung rechtfertigt keinen Krieg"
Wachsende Furcht vor Anschlagen in Deutschland
Union unterstiitzt Bushs Kriegskurs
Terrorismusexperte sieht Gefahr „durch fanatisierte Einzeltater“
20. March 2003
Volkerrechtler kritisieren U.S.-Politik
Rau: Deutschland nicht unmittelbar bedroht
Krieg der Worte im Bundestag
"Viele Menschen ermuntern mich zum Neuanfang"
Bundesregierung auBert sich betroffen
Besttirzung im Bundestag iiber Irak-Krieg
Fischer kritisiert Alleingang der USA gegen Irak
21. March 2003
Schroder erfahrt vom Ausbruch das Krieges aus dem Femsehen
Irak-Krieg sorgt bei Rot-Grim fur Turbulenzen
Streit um Irak-Kurs im CDU-Vorstand
Fischer: Friedliche Alternative war moglich
Sorge um Schicksal von Zivilisten im Irak wachst
Deutsche Soldaten im Ausland geraten emeut in Gefahr
Der Golf-Krieg mobilisiert die Massen
22. March 2003
Abschiebestopp fur irakische Fliichtlinge
Irak-Krieg spaltet Religionsgemeinschaften
"Nach meiner Meinung ist dieser Krieg nicht richtig"
Awacs-Einsatze: FDP klagt in Karlsruhe
"Wenn die Tiirkei sich offensiv am Krieg beteiligt, dann miissen die deutschen AwacsSoldaten abgezogen werden
24. March 2003
Thierse: Deutschland soil dem Irak beim Wiederaufbau helfen
Weltweite Proteste gegen Irak-Krieg
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25. March 2003
"Dies ist ein schandlicher Krieg"
Entscheidung in Karlsruhe
26. March 2003
Nach dem Krieg droht eine Steuererhohung
"Im Haushalt fehlt das Geld fur ein Aufbauprogramm"
Basis rebelliert gegen Merkels Irak-Politik
Die groBte Hilfsaktion der Geschichte lauft an
DRK-Prasident Ipsen: "Bisher noch kein VerstoB gegen die Genfer Konventionen"
Debatte um Wiederaufbau im Irak
Schroder lasst Blauhelm-Einsatz im Irak offen
27. March 2003
"Schroders Reformkurs ist altemativlos"
Frontbilder offnen keine Portemonnaies
28. March 2003
Merz ubt Kritik an Bush-Administration
Nordirakische Oppositionelle in Deutschland fuhlen sich verraten
29. March 2003
Bundesweit sind 50 Demonstrationen gegen den Irak-Krieg geplant
Umfragen: Kanzler konnte von langem Krieg profitieren
Bundesweite Proteste gegen Irak-Krieg
31. March 2003
"Die Bundesregierung musste sich entziehen"
Ein Nachtragshaushalt wird immer wahrscheinlicher
1. Apr 2003
Bundesregierung will Alliierten im Irak nicht militarischen Erfolg wiinschen
Merkel zunehmend unter Druck
2. Apr 2003
Unicef wamt: "Im Irak arbeitet die Zeit gegen die Kinder"
Rau einig mit den beiden groBen Kirchen
73 Prozent der Deutschen unterstiitzen Anti-Kriegs-Kurs
3. Apr 2003
Kohl: Gerhard Schroder ist ein Anti-Amerikaner
4. Apr 2003
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Pfluger: Bundeswehr in den Irak
Der Kanzler vermeidet scharfe Tone
5. Apr 2003
Das Volk macht Stress
Berlin als Mittler zwischen Paris und London
Bundeswehr plant Irak-Einsatz nach dem Krieg
7. Apr 2003
CDU-Basis in NRW begruBt Merkels Irak-Haltung
PDS-Friedensparteitag fehlten die Delegierten
8. Apr 2003
CDU-Spitze gegen Kochs und Steinbriicks Steuerkompromiss
12. Apr 2003
Beim Fall der Mauer gab es keine Toten
14. Apr 2003
Psychologische Hilfe ist unabdingbar
Politiker fur deutsche Beteiligung am wirtschaftlichen Irak-Aufbau
15. Apr 2003
DRK mobilisiert Irak-Hilfe ftir insgesamt 150 Millionen Euro
16. Apr 2003
Umffage: Mehrheit fur Aufbauhilfe im Irak
"Andere tun weniger"
Besuch beim Botschafter Ohneland
22. Apr 2003
OsterMarchsche in 105 Stadten
Papst fordert "solidarischen Wiederaufbau" des Irak
25. Apr 2003
"Die Union ist der politische Verlierer des Monats April"

